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ABSTRACT
This thesis compares the recent rise and decline of two political 
uses of cultural tradition, one in India and one in Singapore. In India, 
the  thesis  examines  the  Hindutva  (Hindu-ness)  movement,  which 
became  influential  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  The  Bharatiya  Janata 
Party, which leads India’s current coalition government, arose from the 
Hindutva movement, but it deemphasized Hindutva themes in favour of 
militaristic nationalism as it came closer to power. In Singapore,  the 
thesis  examines  the  government’s  promotion  of  Confucian  ethics  in 
schools and the media. While this promotion was a major effort in the 
1980s,  the  government  quickly  moved  away  from  it,  and  began 
promoting a more generic form of “Asian values” instead.
The thesis’s aim is to show the underlying similarity between the 
projects of Hindutva and Singapore Confucianism. It does so using a 
modified  version  of  Jürgen  Habermas’s  theory  of  legitimation  crisis. 
Habermas claims that modern states have changed the basis of their 
legitimacy from traditional  worldviews to economic welfare functions, 
and  that  economic  crises  can  now therefore  become  crises  of  state 
legitimacy. The thesis suggests that governments which perceive such a 
crisis may then attempt to turn back to the traditional worldviews. 
The  thesis  proceeds  by  examining  the  post-colonial  history  of 
India  and  Singapore,  discussing  the  many  programs  the  countries’ 
governments  used  to  justify  their  legitimacy.  It  notes  the  financial 
difficulties  the  countries  faced  in  the  years  preceding  the  rise  of 
Hindutva and Singapore Confucianism, and demonstrates how Prime 
Ministers Indira Gandhi and Lee Kuan Yew perceived a crisis. It then 
describes how the rise of Hindutva and Singapore Confucianism quickly 
followed  this  perceived  crisis,  and  how  neither  ideological  project 
ultimately had much apparent effect on legitimacy. Finally, through a 
brief  discussion  of  the  everyday  religio-cultural  practices  of  “Hindu” 
Indians and Singapore Chinese,  it  suggests that the projects did not 
apparently  succeed  because  they  were  too  far  removed  from  those 
practices.
The  conclusion  of  the  thesis  is  as  follows:  Hindutva  and 
Singapore  Confucianism  became  influential  as  responses  to  the 
perceived emergence of legitimation crises. They declined in influence 
because their disconnection from popular practice prevented them from 
restoring political legitimacy.
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I. Introduction
In the 1980s and early 1990s, India’s ruling Congress Party came 
to advocate an agenda of “Hindutva” (literally “Hindu-ness”), a quasi-
religious Hindu Indian nationalism. It  appropriated religious symbols 
and fomented religious conflict to muster support. In so doing it took a 
leaf from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which advocated Hindutva 
much more strongly. The BJP’s influence in Indian politics has risen 
spectacularly.  Having held only two seats in the federal parliament in 
1984, it is now the lead partner in the country’s ruling alliance. As the 
BJP came closer to power, however, it deemphasized Hindutva in favour 
of a more generalized, militaristic nationalism.
At roughly the same time, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which 
has ruled Singapore since its independence in 1965, made a key issue 
out of promoting Confucianism in education and in national campaigns. 
But by the end of the 1980s, it had abandoned Confucianism for a more 
generic platform of “Asian values”.
The world’s second most populous country and a tiny city-state; a 
multiparty democracy and a tightly ordered one-party government;  a 
grassroots social movement and the policy decision of a small political 
clique  —  the  differences  between  Hindutva  and  Singapore 
Confucianism, in themselves and in their contexts, are many. A basic 
similarity,  however,  underlies  both  cases:  a  political  party  makes  a 
nationalistic  attempt  to  use  cultural  practices  and  symbols  that  it 
perceives as belonging to its country’s majority population, constructing 
its image of that culture into a single tradition. And in both places, the 
party increasingly backs away from the attempt, watering it down to 
make it more inclusive.
This thesis compares the actions of the Indian and Singaporean 
governments,  in  their  respective  projects  of  Hindutva and Singapore 
Confucianism. My argument is that there is a deep similarity between 
the two projects,  which can be  illuminated by a modified version of 
Jürgen  Habermas’s  (1988)  theory  of  legitimation  crisis.  The  ruling 
parties in each government — on behalf  of  other ruling groups that 
supported them — had tried to justify their rule as legitimate through 
government programs for the disadvantaged. As those programs became 
more expensive, their ability to support legitimacy came into question, 
and the parties  perceived a crisis in their own legitimacy.  Since the 
parties  were  dominant  parties  whose  structure  had  been  tied  very 
closely to that of the political system, this crisis appeared as one of the 
system’s legitimacy too. Cultural tradition then appeared as a potential 
alternative means of legitimation. But the parties’ use of tradition did 
not  work,  because  it  was  a  strategic  appropriation  that  bore  little 
connection to the actual beliefs and practices of the states’ peoples. So 
they changed direction from that use of tradition to a more generalized 
political  nationalism,  one  that  relied  more  on  defying  American  or 
international opinion and less on connection to any particular tradition.
Having stated the broad contours of the argument, I want to be 
clear about what I am not saying.  I am not arguing that everyone who 
puts forward the Hindutva ideology is motivated by a desire to keep 
control  over  lower  castes.  Likewise,  not  everyone  who  advocated 
Confucianism in Singapore did so in order to preserve the ability  of 
ruling groups to discipline labour. I am convinced that many people do 
believe in the Hindutva ideology in its own terms, rather than in terms 
of the subtext which I seek to illustrate in this thesis. I suspect that 
Singapore Confucianism had its true believers as well.
But what is at issue is why these ideologies became politically 
influential at the time that they did. That influence is what I think came 
out of ruling groups’ desire to legitimate themselves. I suspect it will 
become clear in the course of the thesis that my sympathies do not lie 
with  the  contemporary  advocates  of  Hinduism  and  Confucianism. 
Nevertheless, the point of this thesis is not to refute the ideologies, but 
rather  to  explain  their  growth.  I  submit  that  Habermas’s  theory  of 
legitimation  crisis,  with  a  key  modification,  provides  the  best  such 
explanation.
Theory of legitimation crisis
Habermas takes the concept of crisis from Karl Marx, although he 
claims its roots extend back to Greek tragedy.  A crisis,  in  “classical 
aesthetics from Aristotle to Hegel”, is 
the  turning  point  in  a  fateful  process  that,  despite  all 
objectivity, does not simply impose itself from outside and 
does  not  remain  external  to  the  identity  of  the  person 
caught  up  in  it.  The  contradiction,  expressed  in  the 
catastrophic  culmination  of  conflict,  is  inherent  in  the 
structure  of  the  action  system  and  in  the  personality 
systems of the principal characters. (Habermas 1988: 2)
Marx  (1863)  developed  the  concept  of  an  economic  crisis, 
especially within capitalism. In an argument too long to expound here, 
Marx  claimed  that  capitalism’s  own  internal  contradictions  would 
inevitably produce economic crises (essentially depressions). While each 
individual  crisis  could  be  resolved,  successive  crises  would  be  ever 
deeper, eventually becoming unresolvable and leading to the collapse of 
capitalism.  Habermas  extends  Marx’s  argument  by  claiming  that 
capitalism around the world survived the crises of the early twentieth 
century by transforming itself from the liberal capitalism of Marx’s day 
to a different kind of capitalism, organized capitalism.
The key difference between liberal and organized capitalism is in 
the  involvement  of  the  state.  Under  liberal  (laissez-faire)  capitalism, 
European states played only a few economic roles, such as protecting 
property and printing money. But after the Depression and the World 
Wars,  they  pursued  the  much  more  active  Keynesian  program  of 
intervening in the capitalist economy in order to sustain it and promote 
its  growth.  They  made  massive  improvements  in  infrastructure, 
subsidized education to promote productivity, pushed money into arms 
and  space  exploration  to  stimulate  the  economy,  subsidized  weak 
sectors of the economy, and more. (Habermas 1988: 35)
But  Habermas  argues  that,  although such  attempts  to  secure 
capital  accumulation can preserve  capitalism in  the  short  run,  they 
carry their  own problems within them, problems of  legitimation. For 
Habermas, any state in an unequal and hierarchical society needs to 
justify the existing state of affairs. That is, it needs to justify its own 
legitimacy. Pre-capitalist and early capitalist European states had relied 
for their legitimacy on traditional worldviews and institutions, especially 
religious ones, and their legacy (Habermas 1988: 73-4). But the tumult 
of liberal capitalism, and the state intervention of organized capitalism, 
increasingly called these worldviews and institutions into question.
With traditions declining in influence, organized capitalist states 
came to depend on welfare functions for their legitimacy. The problem 
with this welfare legitimacy was pointed out by James O’Connor (1973), 
from whom Habermas derives an important part of his theory. Social 
welfare  programs  are  extremely  expensive;  and  so  is  preventing 
economic  crisis.  When  economic  crisis  threatens  to  arise,  providing 
social  services  becomes  extremely  difficult  to  afford.  Furthermore, 
acting  on  demands  for  welfare  programs  can  itself  inhibit  economic 
growth, and the cost of those programs will grow with time. (McCarthy 
1978: 366)
So governments must cut back some programs. And there is the 
rub: the state has come to depend on services rather than on tradition 
for its legitimacy, but it cannot continue to provide those services in the 
way that it had. This, says Habermas, creates a legitimation crisis. So 
organized capitalism did not solve the problem of  economic crisis.  It 
merely  displaced  the  problem  into  social  and  cultural  life,  where 
legitimation  crises  occur.  Habermas  does  not  argue  that  this  will 
necessarily lead to the fall of capitalism, but that is a possibility.
Another possibility is the one I am discussing: the state makes an 
effort to return to cultural tradition in order to use it for legitimation. 
Habermas is skeptical of what this can accomplish. The force of cultural  
tradition, for Habermas, is that it  can “guarantee the continuity of a 
history  through  which  individuals  and  groups  can  identify  with 
themselves and with one another.” But it is precisely this force that a 
cultural  tradition  loses  when  it  is  “objectivistically  prepared  and 
strategically  employed”  in  the  manner  of  Hindutva  and  Singapore 
Confucianism. (Habermas 1988: 70-1) I think that the initial attempts 
to put forward a Hindu and Confucian political agenda can be classed 
as failures, and that Habermas’s claim explains why they failed.
What happens  after this failure? Habermas does not say. In my 
two cases, there has been a turn to a political nationalism that is less 
rooted  in  a  particular  cultural  tradition.  Nevertheless,  that  political 
nationalism is, I think, also promoted with the intent that “individuals 
and groups can identify with themselves and with one another” — and 
with the state that supposedly represents them. Since the nationalism 
is  also  objectivistically  prepared  and  strategically  employed,  I  think 
Habermas’s prediction would have to be that it too will ultimately fail. It 
is, however, too early to tell.
What will happen if it  does fail? What does the state do when it 
becomes  apparent  that  neither  welfare  provisions  nor  cultural 
appropriation  will  stave  off  crisis?  Habermas  does  not  answer  this 
question either — not surprisingly, as it would amount to predicting the 
future of capitalism. I also abstain from attempting an answer. It is, of 
course, an interesting and very important question; but it is not one 
that I can address in a thesis like this, and not one that is crucial to an 
explanation of the phenomena I am discussing.
Applying the theory
Habermas, to be sure,  is  entirely concerned with rich Western 
multi-party liberal democracies. Whether his model is intended to apply 
to  poorer  countries,  Asian countries  or  one-party  states is  not  clear 
from  his  analysis.  I  think  that  it  does,  but  it  requires  certain 
adjustments.  India  and  Singapore  may  not  be  welfare  states  in  the 
same  way  that  European  countries  are,  but  the  governments  have 
nevertheless  taken  on  responsibility  for  their  disadvantaged 
populations,  as we will  see;  and they have also attempted to secure 
investment and capital accumulation in order to make their economies 
grow.  They  certainly  face  a  struggle  to  secure  accumulation  and 
legitimation at the same time.
I want to make one key modification to Habermas’s model. Rather 
than attempting to demonstrate the existence of an actual legitimation 
crisis, I want to refer to the perception of crisis by government leaders. 
The major reason for this modification is that the concept of legitimacy 
does not lend itself well to measurement. As a theorist, Habermas does 
not concern himself  with this problem, but it  is significant for those 
who want to apply his ideas to empirical phenomena. Andrew MacIntyre 
observes  that  too  often a  régime’s  legitimacy is  circularly  defined in 
terms of its stability. In such an approach, “particular governments and 
regimes  endured  or  collapsed  because  they  did  or  did  not  enjoy 
sufficient legitimation. How do we know whether they did or did not 
enjoy sufficient legitimation? Because they either endured or collapsed.” 
(MacIntyre 1996: 172) 
In  a  liberal  democratic  regime,  polls  and  elections  can 
demonstrate discontent, and thus perhaps demonstrate the illegitimacy 
of a ruling party. But in a multi-party political system, the legitimacy (or 
illegitimacy) of a political party does not necessarily affect the legitimacy 
of the system. If the Republicans or Labour are seen as unfit to govern, 
for  example,  they  can  easily  be  replaced  by  the  Democrats  or  the 
Conservatives.
Here Singapore is different from liberal democratic states in two 
important ways. First, it is a one-party state, where no party other than 
the PAP has even come close to governing since independence. The PAP 
has structured the  post-independence state  so  that  the  party  is the 
system, and it is difficult to disentangle the legitimacy of the one from 
that of the other. When much of the party’s membership split off from it 
in the 1960s (see page ), the party relied on the civil service as a key 
component of its support base. It merged itself with the state apparatus 
to such a degree that “most functions that a party might normally be 
expected  to  perform”  were  “performed  by  various  governmental 
departments and bodies.” One PAP leader put it succinctly: “We don’t 
differentiate  between  party  and  non-party.”  (Bellows  1970:  29)  The 
ouster of the PAP, in the minds of its leaders at least, would therefore be  
a  disaster  for  the  whole  system.  When the  PAP  registered  its  worst 
electoral showing since independence in 1984, a visibly angry Lee Kuan 
Yew declared on television that the universal franchise might have to be 
reconsidered,  although  he  soon  retracted  the  comment  (Tremewan 
1994: 159). Thus the distinction between party and system legitimacy is 
blurred.
Second, Singapore is an illiberal state, where the media is tightly 
controlled,  expressing  discontent  can  lead  to  denial  of  vital  public 
services, and opposition parties and leaders are systematically harassed 
(see my discussion of J.B. Jeyaretnam on page , for example). In such 
an authoritarian régime, the level of discontent is impossible to gauge 
accurately.
But  that  discontent  is  impossible  to  gauge  even  for  the 
government itself.  The PAP itself  cannot be sure when it is no longer 
perceived as a legitimate ruler. So the government acts as if  a crisis 
were taking place even when it loses a single seat in Parliament. 
Importantly,  this  perceived crisis  has  the  same effect  on state 
actions — my topic of concern in this thesis — as would an actual one. 
And I think the words and actions of government leaders, discussed in 
the  third  chapter,  demonstrate  that  they  perceived  a  crisis.  A 
legitimation crisis may not have existed in fact — but the leaders in 
both countries had created the  preconditions for  a crisis,  and,  I  will 
argue, they knew it. In Singapore especially, I focus on this perception 
of crisis rather than on a crisis itself. This is my main departure from 
Habermas, who does not intend to examine perceived crises, only real 
ones.
The  Congress  in  India  presided  over  a  far  less  authoritarian 
system than Singapore’s, one in which opposition parties had always 
had a voice. Nevertheless, having governed uninterruptedly for decades 
after independence, the Congress too had come to blur the distinctions 
between  party  and  state  organization.  The  structure  by  which 
government projects were distributed and patronage handed out was 
known  as  the  “Congress  system”,  and  independent  India  had  lived 
under nothing else until Indira Gandhi attacked it. But for Indira the 
Congress, under her leadership, remained the only party that could rule 
India; a weakening of its own fortunes was quickly perceived as a threat 
to the system as a whole, demonstrated by her readiness to declare a 
state of emergency in 1975-77 when the courts questioned her right to 
rule  amid  widespread  protests  against  her  (see  page   and  timeline 
appendix). The events leading up to the Emergency were, I think, a real 
crisis for the party. Whether they were a real crisis for the  system is 
more difficult to say, but I think they were perceived as such. It is not 
as yet clear what will replace the legitimating function of the Congress 
system, and I think Hindutva is best understood as an attempt to find a 
replacement.
The differences  between  the  political  systems point  to  another 
important difference between the two projects. Singapore Confucianism 
was  entirely a government action; no Singaporeans, to my knowledge, 
had advocated Confucianism, from the 1920s until the day Lee Kuan 
Yew made it into policy. Hindutva, on the other hand, had significant 
grassroots  support  behind  it.  This  is  not  to  say  that  a  majority of 
Indians agreed with Hindutva; I will be arguing that they did not and do 
not. But the relation of Hindutva to the Indian state is quite different 
from that of Confucianism to the Singaporean state. The significance of 
this for my argument is that the  existence of Hindutva should not be 
seen as a response to a legitimation crisis, real or perceived. Only its 
recent growth in political influence should, I think, be seen in that light.
I  intend to show that  the two cases I  discuss have followed a 
similar pattern, one which fits Habermas’s theory as modified: first, a 
state  takes deliberate planning actions in the name of  accumulation 
and legitimation; then the actions for legitimation become more difficult 
to afford, and  there emerges a perception that the system’s legitimacy 
is in crisis; attempts are then made to restore the tradition’s authority; 
but in the end it is too late, for the tradition at this point does not hold 
sufficient legitimating power.
I  have  ordered  the  thesis  according  to  the  chronology  of  this 
pattern.  The  second  chapter  provides  background  on  the  social 
structures of the colonial era, the dominant political parties of the post-
independence era and the ruling social groups with which they were 
associated.  The third chapter describes ways in which ruling groups 
perceived  their  legitimacy  declining.  The  fourth  chapter  describes  in 
detail the attempts to use cultural tradition to legitimate, and the fifth 
describes these attempts’ failure and ultimate replacement.
The pattern, as described, played out over slightly different time 
periods  in Singapore and India,  although the  periods  overlapped.  In 
Singapore,  the  government  based its  legitimacy on welfare programs 
from the early ‘60s until the early ‘80s; the government attempted to 
promote what it saw as “Confucian” traditions from 1982 until 1989; 
and  in  the  years  that  followed,  this  effort  at  rehabilitation  was 
abandoned and replaced with a more inclusive “Asian values”.
In India, the timing of the pattern was somewhat more complex. 
Government planning efforts that weakened traditional authority had 
been going on for a longer time. The effort to construct “Hindu” tradition 
had gone on as a social movement since before independence in 1947; 
but  it  only  reached  mass  support  levels,  and  government 
implementation, in the mid-1980s. The party most directly connected to 
the use of Hindutva began to move away from it over the course of the 
1990s  as  it  moved  towards  power,  replacing  Hindutva  with  a  more 
militaristic nationalism.
Issues of comparison
I  want  to  mention  three  axes  on  which  my  comparison  takes 
place.  The  first  and  second,  related  to  time,  point  out  similarities 
between  the  two  phenomena  I  am  comparing;  the  third,  related  to 
space, points out a key difference. The first is state action: these are not 
just  any  appropriations  of  cultural  tradition,  but  appropriations  by 
political parties which were either in government or would be soon. The 
second is simultaneity: the two projects occurred at roughly the same 
time, give or take a few years. The third is the great spatial difference 
between India  and Singapore;  because  of  India’s  democratic  system, 
Hindutva (unlike Singapore Confucianism)  depended a great  deal  on 
popular  support,  which  varied  widely  from  place  to  place,  so  my 
comparison must examine regional differences in India, differences that 
are absent in Singapore’s tiny geographic area.
I  specify  that  the  thesis  compares  state  actions  because  both 
actions  have  non-state  precedents  which  are  not  my  topic.  The 
existence  of  Hindutva  is  not  a  recent  phenomenon;  only  its  rise  in 
influence  is.  The idea of  Hindutva goes  back to  the 1920s with the 
nationalist leader V.D. Savarkar, who defined a Hindu as anyone who 
considered  India  both  a  fatherland and a  holy  land  (thus  including 
Jains and Sikhs but not Muslims or Christians). Savarkar’s ideas were 
taken  up  by  a  group  of  Hindu-nationalist  organizations  known 
collectively as the Sangh Parivar, whose most influential members at 
the  outset  were  the  Rashtriya  Swayamsevak  Sangh  (RSS)  youth 
organization  and  the  Vishwa  Hindu  Parishad  (VHP)  religious 
organization. Politically, Hindutva came to be associated with issues of 
promoting  Hinduism,  of  anti-Muslim  policy,  and  more  frequently  of 
both.  In  1951,  Sangh Parivar  members  founded  a  national  political 
party called the Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh argued that public schools 
in Uttar Pradesh should restrict themselves to teaching Hindi and avoid 
teaching Urdu, the related language spoken by north Indian Muslims. 
(Graham 1990) But the Jan Sangh never achieved a significant level of 
national influence (see table 3, page ). As Graham (1990: 253) notes, its 
appeal was confined primarily to speakers of Hindi (concentrated in the 
north), to the priestly caste of Brahmins and especially to urban small 
business (groups among which there was considerable overlap). Without 
a rural base, it had little chance of reaching power.
Hindutva  exhibits  a  continuity  between  pre-  and  post-
independence years which Singapore Confucianism lacks. But the PAP’s 
appropriation of Confucianism is also not entirely without precedent. 
Following the mainland Chinese Confucian revival movement of K’ang 
Yu-wei  in  1895,  many  Chinese  in  Malaya  and  Singapore 
enthusiastically established Confucian temples, promoted the study of 
Confucianism  and  observed  Confucius’s  birthday.  This  movement, 
however, did not attempt to involve the (colonial) state. (Yen 1995: 231-
3)  Moreover,  the  fall  of  the  mainland  Chinese  monarchy  in  1911 
deprived Confucianism of its traditional institutional embodiment; and 
within  a  few  years,  the  May  Fourth  Movement  would  come  to  hold 
Confucianism responsible for many of China’s social problems (Dirlik 
1995: 232). So the influence of this Confucianism rapidly faded. In no 
speech or discussion of the PAP have I found a reference to this neo-
Confucianism of the early twentieth century.
The  phenomena  I  discuss  are  different  from  the  older  ones 
because they are state actions, associated with ruling political parties in 
the post-independence situation. That is the way in which they are new, 
and it is only because they are state actions that they can be considered  
reactions to legitimation crisis. While the BJP did not reach power until 
its Hindutva agenda had been watered down considerably, the Congress 
adopted many Hindutva-oriented symbols and policies during the BJP’s 
rise in the 1980s.
Is  it  a  coincidence  that  Hindutva and Singapore Confucianism 
both rose to influence in the 1980s? I don’t think so. Scaling back the 
welfare  state  while  appealing  to  majoritarian  cultural  (religious) 
tradition was, after all, the hallmark of Ronald Reagan’s presidency in 
the same time period. And although Margaret Thatcher’s attack on the 
welfare  state  was  not  accompanied  by  as  explicit  a  religio-cultural 
agenda, it nevertheless appealed to national sentiment in the Falklands 
War; Thatcher was also prone to making statements about culture such 
as “The mission of this Government is much more than the promotion 
of  economic  progress.  It  is  to  renew the  spirit  and solidarity  of  the 
nation.” (quoted in Riddell 1994: 22) These cases were often not isolated 
from  each  other;  ideas  were  shared.  The  inspiration  for  Singapore 
Confucianism, I will argue (page ), came largely from Western writers, 
many  of  whom,  like  Herman  Kahn,  were  at  least  as  concerned  to 
promote New Right ideology at home as to support the “Confucianism” 
they considered to exist in Asia.
A key difference between the two movements is this: Hindutva, 
having begun at the grassroots with the Sangh Parivar and BJP, had 
considerable regional variations. By contrast, Singapore Confucianism 
was a project conceived of entirely at the central level of government. 
Besides, it would be difficult to speak of any “regional” basis even to 
grassroots movements,  simply because the city-state  is  physically  so 
small.
This difference raises some difficulties for comparison. Hindutva 
in the 1980s and early 1990s was enacted by federal governments and 
federal  political  parties;  in  that  sense,  my  comparison  is  between 
Singapore and all of India. But the popular support for Hindutva was 
confined to particular states in the north and west of India. The BJP 
drew  its  greatest  support  from  Uttar  Pradesh,  Rajasthan,  Madhya 
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Haryana and Gujarat (see table 1). 
These were all among the states where the Congress was strongest in 
1980  (Ludden  1996:  19).  Since  India  is  a  multi-party  democracy, 
Hindutva could not have risen to the level of influence it reached in the 
‘80s  without  this  popular  support.  An  explanation  of  the  rise  of 
Hindutva, comparative or otherwise, must therefore involve an intensive 
examination of regions where Hindutva was the strongest.
Table 1:  % of popular vote for Hindutva parties in major Indian 
states (federal elections)
Jan Sangh BJP
State 1967 1971 1984 1989 1991
Bihar 11.1 12.1 6.9 13.0 16.0
Delhi 46.7 29.6 18.8 26.2 40.2
Gujarat – 2.2 18.6 30.5 50.4
Haryana 19.9 11.2 7.5 8.3 10.2
Himachal 
Pradesh
19.1 10.6 23.3 45.3 42.8
Jammu and 
Kashmir
20.3 12.2 1.7 7.2 – 
Karnataka 2.3 1.9 4.7 2.6 28.8
Kerala 1.4 1.4 1.8 4.5 4.6
Madhya 
Pradesh
29.6 33.6 30 39.7 41.9
Maharashtra 7.4 5.2 10.1 23.7 20.2
Orissa 0.6 0.2 1.2 1.3 9.5
Punjab 12.5 4.5 3.4 4.2 17.0
Rajasthan 10.3 12.4 23.7 29.6 40.9
Tamil Nadu 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.7
Uttar Pradesh 22.2 12.3 6.4 7.6 32.8
West Bengal 1.4 0.9 1.7 11.7 9.5
Source: Butler, Lahiri and Roy 1995; India Today 1991.
In particular, I pay the closest attention to Uttar Pradesh. This is 
partially because Uttar Pradesh is widely studied, and data are easier to 
obtain. There are, however, several other reasons why it deserves pride 
of place: it is the most populous state in India, and thus the one which 
has the greatest influence on the overall results of elections. It is also a 
state where the influence of Hindutva grew rapidly in the period I am 
discussing (unlike Madhya Pradesh and Delhi, where the BJP was not 
much more popular than the old Jan Sangh); as such, I think it is likely 
the best place to observe the growth of Hindutva close-up.
Nevertheless,  Uttar  Pradesh  is  not  a  microcosm of  India,  and 
cannot be taken as a stand-in for the whole country. I have therefore 
attempted to make comparisons across states throughout the thesis. In 
addition to discussing other northern states where the BJP rose, such 
as Rajasthan and Gujarat, I also analyze southern states such as Tamil 
Nadu,  where  the  BJP  remains  relatively  unsuccessful,  as  a 
counterexample that, I think, can shed some light on its growth in the 
north — and on why the BJP moderated itself in taking power at the 
centre. I argue that the caste structures of the south were sufficiently 
different to diminish the appeal of Hindutva there, and that Hindutva’s 
limited appeal in the south is a key part of the reason for the BJP’s 
moderating of it.
II. Historical background
This chapter describes the political systems of post-independence 
India and Singapore, referring especially to the ruling parties of the era 
and to the dominant groups that underlay their strength. In India, the 
Congress before and after independence was backed by the dominant 
rural castes, which had traditionally ruled the villages at the local level. 
In Singapore, the PAP began as an alliance between English-educated 
Chinese  elites  and  the  Chinese  working  class,  but  the  role  of  the 
working class was soon eclipsed by that of transnational corporations.
Caste and Congress
The legitimacy of the Congress after India’s independence rested 
on rural1 groups known as the dominant castes, who had historically 
been  considered  legitimate  rulers  at  the  local  level.  Caste is  widely 
recognized  to  be  a  central  structuring  principle  in  traditional  and 
modern Indian society.  Although ideas related to caste can be dated 
back thousands of years, the caste system as it appeared in colonial 
India  was  considerably  more  recent.  The  British  colonists  played  a 
major role in making caste categories more rigid than they had once 
been,  although the extent  of  the British role in forming the modern 
caste system is a matter of some dispute. (Fuller 1996: 5-6)
Many popular accounts of caste in India describe it in terms of 
1The rural areas have been the most important areas to analyze 
in  Indian  society,  as  the  country’s  population  has  been 
overwhelmingly rural. In 1971, only about 10% of the population 
lived in cities of over 100 000 people (Kolenda 1978: 141).
the varna system as set forth in the Vedas, in which four broad “castes” 
are  ranked  from  highest  to  lowest:  Brahmins  (priests);  Kshatriyas 
(warriors  and  rulers);  Vaishyas  (merchants),  now  usually  known  as 
Banias;  and  Shudras  (peasants,  labourers  and servants).  The  varna 
system can be quite  misleading as a description of  the Indian caste 
system, not only because of the “untouchables” and “tribals” considered 
effectively beneath the hierarchy and not mentioned in the Vedas. Caste 
in India today refers to the thousands of quasi-ethnic groups known as 
jatis, which can be an uncomfortable fit with the varna system. A jati is 
traditionally distinguished from other jatis by rules of endogamy (one is 
supposed to marry within one’s  jati) and to a lesser extent by rules of 
commensality (one is only supposed to eat food prepared by fellow jati 
members).  The  majority  of  India’s  population  falls  into  jati groups 
traditionally described as “Shudra” (although now usually described by 
the acronym OBCs, for “Other Backward Castes”). (Stern 1993: 52-83)
A somewhat more precise conceptual rendering divides jatis into 
three categories. The term “upper caste” generally refers to the three 
groups placed above the Shudras in the  varna system. “Middle caste” 
refers to the majority of  the OBC groups, especially those which are 
relatively well off. “Lower caste” refers to the poorest OBCs along with 
the tribals (“Scheduled Tribes” or STs) and the untouchables (the latter 
often called SCs for “Scheduled Castes”, or more often by the political 
term Dalits, meaning “oppressed”).
A crucial distinction, although with considerable overlap, exists 
between the concepts of upper caste and dominant caste. The concept of 
the  dominant  caste  became  influential  through  the  work  of  M.N. 
Srinivas  (1955).  For  Srinivas,  the  dominant  caste  in  a  village 
“preponderates  numerically  over  the  other  castes”  and  “wields 
preponderant  economic  and political  power”;  it  also  controls  a  large 
proportion of the village land. I think, however, that Louis Dumont’s 
definition is more helpful than Srinivas’s. Dumont (1980: 161) leaves 
out the criterion of numerical preponderance, pointing out that in many 
villages a client caste, often untouchable, is more numerous than the 
caste that is dominant by other measures.  For Dumont, a dominant 
caste  “reproduces  the  royal  function  at  village  level”;  its  main 
characteristics are as follows:
(1)  relatively eminent right over the land; (2)  as a result, 
power to grant land and to employ members of other castes 
either in agricultural capacities or as specialists, to build 
up a large clientele, not to say an armed force; (3) power of 
justice also: the notables of the dominant caste are often 
entrusted with the arbitration of differences in other castes 
or between different castes, and they can exact penalties for 
unimportant offences... (4) generally speaking, monopoly of 
authority: if the village headman chosen by the State is not 
one of the dominant notables he can only be their pawn, 
unless  he  has  unrivalled  personal  qualities;  (5)  the 
homology extends so far that the dominant caste is often a 
royal caste, a caste allied to royal castes (Mayer), or a caste 
with  similar  characteristics  (meat  diet,  polygyny,  etc.) 
(Dumont 1980: 162-3)
In general, members of a village’s dominant caste would “tend to 
feel that they really are the village and all others in it are there only as 
their dependents or hangers-on” (Mandelbaum 1970: 359-60) — even if 
they do not preponderate numerically. Dominant castes would have a 
local or regional caste  panchayat (council)  which “looked after issues 
like ensuring the proper conduct of members of a caste with respect to 
their hereditary rights and obligations.” (Karanth 1996: 89) Panchayats 
dealt with many possible offences that could be committed by members 
or  non-members  of  the  jati,  including  non-payment  of  debts,  killing 
cows or other forbidden animals, petty assaults or refusing to maintain 
a wife. (Karanth 1996: 89)
When a group with a lower position sought to raise its status, it 
would typically try to imitate the dominant group, often to the point of 
taking on the name of that group for itself.  (Mandelbaum 1970: 445) 
Sanskritization  is  a  name  for  this  process,  by  which  lower  castes 
emulate upper castes in order to gain respect and ritual status (Srinivas 
1966: 6). The process of Sanskritization usually involves conflict with 
castes ranked higher, and successful Sanskritization therefore usually 
requires access to political and economic resources. At the same time, 
Sanskritization affirms the traditional model of caste because it does 
not challenge the idea of caste hierarchy. (Stern 1993: 67)
The relationship between ritual status (by which a  jati group is 
considered an upper caste) and dominance can be complex. The upper-
caste status of Brahmins and Banias is usually not ambiguous, but 
that of the Kshatriyas certainly is. Some argue that there have been no 
“true”  Kshatriyas  since  the  fifth  century  B.C.  Several  contemporary 
castes, such as the Thakurs and Rajputs, likely come from a Shudra 
lineage, but have long claimed Kshatriya status, and have been widely 
accepted as such. (Srinivas 1966: 9-10) Not coincidentally, these “neo-
Kshatriya” jatis are among the most likely to be dominant castes. They 
have often come to support a Hindutva agenda, but their support has 
been more lukewarm than that of the Brahmins and Banias. Middle 
castes,  such  as  Yadavs,  Kurmis  and  Kolis,  have  more  recently 
attempted to claim Kshatriya status as well, but the claim has not been 
widely accepted.  (Hasan 1989: 178)
At  a  scale  larger  than  the  village,  the  dominant  castes  have 
exercised an influence considerably larger than their  numbers might 
indicate, for reasons described by Robert Stern:
Dominant  jatis combine  the  virtues  that  characterize 
powerful interest groups in most parliamentary democratic 
systems:  they are large,  generally  well-to-do,  respectable, 
self-confident, attractive as allies, well-connected politically 
and  spokesmen  for  their  own  interests....  dominant  jati 
households are usually  patrons,  and this  enhances their 
other  interest  group  virtues.   Clients,  for  example,  are 
amenable to their patrons’ voting instructions. (Stern 1993: 
90)
Thus  the  rule  of  dominant  castes  was  reflected  in  national 
politics,  where  the  Congress  party  had  an  intricate  network  of 
patronage relations. In the 1930s, as the Congress began to be elected 
to power in several Indian states, almost half of its new members came 
from landowning  dominant  castes.  These  quickly  came  to  dominate 
most Congress committees,  sometimes by fraudulent means (Frankel 
1978: 72-4). As a result, the central committee of the Congress became 
controlled by a group of state dominant-caste leaders who would come 
to be known as the Syndicate (Lele 1994: 47). 
From  independence  until  the  mid-1960s,  the  Congress  party 
dominated Indian politics both in the legislature and in its strong but 
flexible  extra-parliamentary  organization  of  party  committees, 
controlled,  as  mentioned,  by  dominant-caste  leaders.  The  party’s 
hierarchy of committees, which distributed patronage, was elaborate: a 
Central Election Committee at the national level, then committees at the 
state  level  for  each  state  and  additional  committees  for  each  local 
district.  The system of  committees  did  a  great  deal  to  maintain  the 
Congress’s  political  dominance  because  it  allowed  competition  for 
resources to be contained within the party. (Lele 1981: 143) Since the 
distribution of political resources occurred largely by means of these 
committees, the distinction between system and party was blurred.
James Manor (1990: 63-4) argues that the Congress’s legislative 
strength rested on its organizational strength, and that  “[t]he might, 
the  reach,  and  the  subtlety  of  its  organization  also  enabled  it  to 
dominate  the  actions  of  bureaucrats  who  were  charged  with  the 
implementation  of  policies  and  laws  at  regional  and,  especially,  at 
subregional levels.” Through the organization of the Congress and its 
committees,  dominant  caste  leaders  ran  a  patronage  system — the 
“Congress system” — which
worked  because  the  relations  between  social  “superiors” 
and “inferiors,” especially in the villages, were characterized 
in this period by the latter’s  relative acquiescence.   As a 
result, rural elites were periodically able to sway the votes 
of  the  lower  strata  toward the  Congress  in  exchange  for 
resources  the  Congress  government  controlled.   (Kohli 
1990b: 5)
The  picture  just  given  of  caste  dominance  in  India  is  a 
generalization  intended  to  apply  more  or  less  to  the  whole  country. 
Naturally,  it  varies  considerably  from  region  to  region.  The  most 
important regional varation is this: in the northern and western states 
where the BJP became influential,  the dominant castes could largely 
also be  considered upper  castes.  In Uttar  Pradesh,  for  example,  the 
dominant castes have typically been Brahmins and Thakurs, who in the 
1960s together owned 57% of the land in the state (Hasan 1989: 153). 
In  Gujarat  they  have  been  Brahmins,  Banias  and Rajputs,  but  also 
some  Patidars,  a  middle  caste  (Shah  1989:  110).  In  Rajasthan 
Brahmins had little influence, but the widely dominant Rajputs made 
up for it; those lower groups who attempted to Sanskritize in Rajasthan 
generally sought to emulate Rajputs (Narain and Mathur 1989: 17).
The  picture  is  quite  different  in  the  southern  states.  There, 
Brahmins,  Banias  and  Rajputs  have  been  much  less  powerful.  The 
dominant castes have been various ritually Shudra groups, such as the 
Kapus and Kammas in Andhra Pradesh (Reddy 1989: 268, 285), the 
Lingayats  and Vokkaligas  in  Karnataka  (Manor  1989:  333-4)  or  the 
Vellalas  in  Tamil  Nadu  (Frankel  1990:  229).  Brahmins  in  southern 
villages, in fact, were often quite poor (Manor 1989: 341). The power 
wielded by Brahmins in the south emerged primarily in the cities and 
towns  under  British  colonialism,  where  they  took  the  greatest 
advantage  of  educational  opportunities  and  joined  the  colonial 
administration (Frankel 1990: 231-2).
Politics in the south have also been dominated by ritually  low 
castes since about the 1950s. The Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK), 
in power in Tamil Nadu for most of its history, emerged initially from 
the assertion of urban Vellalas against urban Brahmins (Frankel 1990: 
233). Kerala was exceptional in that the Ezhava jati, a Scheduled Caste, 
was highly influential in its politics under the ruling Communist Party. 
The dominant middle-caste Nairs were less likely to vote Communist, 
and were less influential in Kerala politics as a result. (Nossiter 1932: 
134)
West Bengal, in the east, diverged more from the dominant-caste 
model that applies to most of India. While certain castes may have been 
dominant  at  the  village  level,  caste  groupings  were  too  small  to  be 
influential  statewide.  Caste  identities  in  general  were  not  strong. 
Partially  for  this  reason,  upper-caste  left-wingers  who  ran  the 
Communist  Party  successfully  formed  alliances  with  peasants  and 
urban workers from the lower castes. (Kohli 1989: 375)
Despite these regional variations, political power in most of post-
independence India was held by the rural dominant castes (whose ritual 
status was high in the north and low in the south) at the local level. The 
support of those castes kept the Congress in power at the national level.  
The network of dominant-caste-controlled committees in the Congress 
system was the chief  means for distributing political resources,  thus 
containing  much  of  the  country’s  political  activity  within  the  party 
organization. In the 1970s, Indira Gandhi would attack the Congress 
system and change the party’s electoral coalition dramatically, relying 
instead for a time on votes from a coalition of disadvantaged groups 
(lower castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims). But as we will see, the 
success of this strategy was short-lived because of the party’s inability 
to  deliver  material  improvements  to  those  groups.  The  end  of  the 
Congress system and the failure of the poor-based strategy, I will argue, 
are what led to the Congress’s eventual embrace of Hindutva.
The Singapore Chinese and the founding of the PAP
The island of Singapore was settled only by a few Malay villages 
until  the  arrival  of  the  British  in  the  19th  century.  Under  British 
colonialism,  many  Chinese  came  there  seeking  their  fortunes;  these 
Chinese numbered over a million by 1900 (Trocki 1990: 4). They were 
divided by social class; peasants who worked on pepper and gambier 
plantations conflicted with the wealthy Chinese merchants in Singapore 
town,  who  were  allied  with  the  colonial  state  and  involved  in  its 
economy (Trocki 1990: 41).
Yen  Ching-hwang  argues,  nevertheless,  that  when  they  were 
united by kinship and linguistic ties (as was often the case), employers 
and employees had “mutual and paternalistic” relations:
The employer, who was also a kinsman, relative, or fellow 
from  the  same  district  as  the  employee,  assumed  the 
position of superior, who had the welfare of his employee at 
heart,  and  who  looked  after  the  employee  as  much  as 
possible. In return, the employee who [sic] was obliged to 
owe him absolute loyalty,  and worked to  the best  of  his 
ability  for  him.  Based  on  this  mutual  good  faith,  the 
employer would occasionally improve his employee’s wages 
and working conditions, and he would take it as his moral 
duty  to  improve  the  quality  of  life  of  his  employee.  (Yen 
1995: 11-12)
Yen  describes  this  relationship,  notably,  as  the  “traditional 
Confucian”  relationship  between  superiors  and  subordinates.  And 
indeed, the Analects2 and other traditional classics are widely seen as 
encouraging  such  a  paternalistic  relation  between  ruler  and  ruled 
(Jones 1993: 22-3; Lai 1995: 258-9).  This would prove to be a main 
source of inspiration for the PAP’s adoption of Confucian ideology. The 
extent  to  which the  relationship  (as practiced)  was actually  founded 
upon the philosophy of the Confucian classics is doubtful, however, as I 
will demonstrate later.
Education became a major social cleavage among the Singapore 
Chinese.  A  few  Chinese,  especially  the  Babas  (long-settled  Chinese 
influenced by Malay culture), first got educated in English, in British 
schools. Nationalist fervour after 1911 led many overseas Chinese to 
establish Chinese-language schools, although these also had little to do 
with Chinese tradition, the classical examination system already having 
2Confucius’s collected sayings.
been abandoned in China. Those who were educated in Chinese were 
often more highly regarded than those who were educated in English, 
but an English education continued to provide more local opportunity. 
A Chinese education did little to help one advance in Malaya, and the 
Chinese-educated often remained working-class. (Wang 1989: 239-40)
As the Japanese moved to invade Singapore in 1941, the colonial 
government  cooperated  with  the  Malayan  Communist  Party,  which 
claimed to  control  many labour  unions (Turnbull  1989:  172-3).  The 
Communist Party’s guerrillas in Malaya played a significant part in the 
anti-Japanese war effort, and when the British returned to Malaya and 
Singapore they recognized the party officially and gave a medal to its 
leader, Chin Peng (Turnbull 1989: 223).
Divisions  between  Chinese-educated  and  English-educated 
Chinese  continued  to  grow sharper.  The  English-educated,  who  had 
status and wealth under British rule  (though never as much as the 
British themselves), formed moderate and conservative political parties 
with  the  intention  of  gradually  increasing  local  autonomy  and  self-
determination (Turnbull 1989: 233-4). The Chinese-educated, because 
of  both  their  low  status  and their  ties  to  China,  tended  to  support 
socialist and Communist parties that intended revolution against the 
British (Wang 1989: 240).
Conditions worsened after  the  war:  widespread unemployment, 
food shortages and an increasing cost of  living (Turnbull  1989: 224, 
227).  Cooperation betweeen the British and the Malayan Communist 
Party halted after the war’s end. In 1948, unions attempted to launch a 
general strike and the Communists decided to enter a period of “armed 
struggle” (Bedlington 1978: 75). In response, the colonial government 
declared  a  state  of  emergency,  banned  the  Communist  Party  and 
detained many radical activists.(Turnbull 1989: 232-3).3
By  1954,  the  state  of  emergency  had  ended,  although  the 
repression of left-wing parties had not. Malaya and Singapore prepared 
for their first general elections in 1955. In Singapore, two very different 
factions allied to form the People’s Action Party (PAP). The leftist faction, 
by  far  the  larger,  included  Chinese-educated,  largely  working-class 
socialists with some Communist ties and leanings. The other faction, 
which came to assume most of the leadership positions, was a small 
group  of  English-educated  middle-class  Chinese  centred  around  the 
party leader, Lee Kuan Yew. (Bedlington 1978: 200) The second most 
influential  member of  Lee’s faction was Goh Keng Swee, who played 
several different roles in the story that follows.
The two factions formed a single  party  largely  out  of  strategic 
necessity.  The  leftists  needed  the  Lee  faction  to  negotiate  with  the 
British. After the state of emergency, the Singapore left was in disarray, 
and  the  colonial  government  continued  to  repress  left-wing  parties. 
Without  Lee  and  his  English-educated  circle  of  leaders  to  put  a 
“respectable face” on the PAP, it would likely have been seen as another 
Communist  party  and  been  banned.  The  Lee  faction,  meanwhile, 
needed the leftists for a base of popular support to carry it to power, for 
its members had no such base of their own. (Bellows 1970: 18-21)
Although  the  PAP  was  a  Singaporean  party,  it  advocated 
3This  state  of  emergency  is  commonly  referred  to  as  “the 
Emergency”. I avoid the usage in this paper, since I use the same 
term for the 1975-77 Indian Emergency under Indira Gandhi. The 
term  “the  Emergency”  in  India  was  in  fact  taken  from  the 
Malayan case, but I felt that using the same term for both in a 
comparative paper would be confusing.
independence  for  a  unified  Malaya  that  would  include  Singapore.  It 
differed  from the  other  major  anticolonial  party,  the  United  Malays’ 
National  Organization  (UMNO),  in  that  UMNO  advocated  special 
privileges for the generally  impoverished Malay population,  while the 
PAP  argued  against  ethnic  preferential  treatment.  (Bedlington  1978: 
200) The PAP was a party composed by and large of the Chinese, who 
would be hurt by any special  treatment for Malays.  It  was a Straits 
Chinese anticolonial party, which was the reason the two factions felt 
that they were on the same side.
The PAP took office in Singapore after winning elections in 1959. 
Dissension between the two factions was quick to emerge. In a 1960 
move  to  control  labour  that  would  become  characteristic,  the 
government  under  Lee  enacted  legislation  prohibiting  strikes  and 
lockouts once a dispute was referred to the government’s arbitration 
court (Wong 1983: 264).  This policy planted seeds of  distrust in the 
leftist  faction,  which  became  increasingly  uneasy  as  the  Lee  faction 
negotiated  union  with  Malaya  and  kept  the  details  of  this  union 
shrouded in secrecy. Eventually,  in 1961,  the leftist members of  the 
PAP quit the party to form a new party, the Barisan Sosialis. (Bellows 
1970: 42-5)
This split was a disaster for the PAP, because those leftists had 
been its lifeblood. Over  60% of the party membership defected to the 
Barisan, as did most of the party organization. Of about 35 paid party 
staffers, no more than four remained with the PAP. (Bellows 1970: 28) 
The PAP in 1961 consisted of little more than the always tiny English-
educated Lee faction of leaders; it had become a group of party leaders 
with no party to lead.
The  leaders  quickly  found  ways  to  reinvent  the  party.  Their 
greatest fortune, ironically, was that the party had been in power for 
such a short time. For Singapore’s institutions — the police, the army, 
and above all the civil service bureaucracy — had been put in place by 
pre-PAP colonial  régimes.  Those who staffed  this  political  machinery 
were therefore not loyal to the Barisan, and the PAP moved to secure 
their  cooperation.  The  bureaucratic  organization  effectively  displaced 
the party organization. (Bellows 1970: 29) The party set up district-level 
organizations, the Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs), officially 
in order to solicit requests and complaints from the grassroots (Bellows 
1970: 106). This system appeared to differ from the Congress system 
(see  page  )  in  that  it  was  not  officially  contained  within  the  party 
organization. But the CCCs remained controlled by the PAP and were 
used as a vehicle  for distributing pro-PAP propaganda (Rodan 1989: 
74),  thus  blurring  the  line  between  system and party  much  as  the 
Congress system had.
The  PAP  dramatically  shifted  its  electoral  base  in  the  1963 
election. Although the party exploited its control of the state apparatus 
during  the  campaign,  detaining  many  opposition  leaders  and  using 
radio and television as propaganda tools (Minchin 1990: 127-30), the 
majority of those who had voted PAP in 1959 nevertheless voted Barisan 
Sosialis.  The PAP held  power  because  it  combined  a  minority  of  its 
former  voters with a majority  of  those  who had previously voted for 
conservative  parties.  It  attracted  these  voters  by  urging  “left 
nationalists”  and  “right  nationalists”  to  unite  against  “communism”, 
and painted the Barisan as a Communist threat. (Margolin 1989: 96-8)
The new PAP was no longer a working-class party, and specifically  
it  was no longer a party of  the Chinese-educated.  Where 70% of  its 
members  had  been  Chinese-educated  before  the  Barisan  split,  the 
figure  was  34% by  1965.  Likewise,  60% of  PAP members  had been 
union members in 1961; by 1965, only 28% were. (Margolin 1989: 94-5)
Both  of  these  shifts  in  the  party’s  demographic  base  were 
reflected  in  its  policies.  The  party  made  several  attacks  on  the 
institutions  of  the  Chinese-educated,  which  will  be  described in  the 
next chapter. Party members saw exports as the only way for the tiny 
new  republic  to  survive  economically,  and  they  saw  attracting 
transnational corporations as the way to accomplish this. Managers of 
transnational  corporations became a key part  of  the PAP base;  they 
“found themselves playing a more significant role in government policy 
formulation, through their links with government statutory boards and 
state-owned companies, than they might have expected to play in most 
other countries.” (Khong 1995: 121)
In the attempt to attract global capital, the PAP put through a 
variety of draconian controls on labour far stronger than its initial ones. 
In 1966, it banned strikes not approved through secret ballot by the 
majority  of  a  union’s  members,  strikes  in  “essential  services”,  and 
sympathy strikes. In 1968, as well as taking a variety of measures to 
increase  working  hours  (increasing  the  length  of  the  standard  work 
week,  reducing sick leave  and public  holidays,  etc.),  the PAP barred 
issues of  promotions,  transfers,  dismissals,  reinstatements and work 
assignments  from  union  negotiation  and  limited  the  occasion  for 
resettling collective agreements by increasing the minimum duration of 
such agreements from 18 months to three years. (Rodan 1989: 91-2) 
For  a  while,  the  PAP found controlling  labour  straightforward. 
Few strikes occurred in the early 1970s, and none between 1977 and 
1985. (Pang et al. 1989: 130) Rodan (1989: 93) claims that by 1969, 
“militant  trade  unionism  was  finished  in  Singapore.”  When  the 
government’s National Wages Council recommended “wage restraint” as 
a  response  to  the  recession  of  the  mid-1970s,  it  experienced  little 
difficulty in implementing this (Rodan 1989: 124).
The PAP’s remarkable monopoly on elections appeared a sign of 
its legitimacy. In four elections from 1968 to 1980, the party won every 
seat in parliament and at least 69% of the popular vote (see table 2) — 
an enviable  record for  any political  party.  These elections,  moreover, 
were conducted by secret ballot and there have been no allegations of 
outright  electoral  fraud  even  from  bitter  enemies  of  the  PAP.  Thus 
despite  the  repression  of  opposition  parties  and  the  brazen 
gerrymandering and patronage which so often characterize Singapore 
elections, the PAP could claim its solid electoral record as evidence of its 
legitimacy.
Table 2: The PAP in Singapore elections since independence 
Election year Seats in assembly PAP seats PAP % of vote 
1968 58 58 84
1972 65 65 69
1976 69 69 73
1980 75 75 76
1984 79 77 63
1988 81 80 62
1991 81 77 61
1997 83 81 65
Sources: Tremewan 1994: 181; Curry 1997: 69.
On  what  did  Singapore  ruling  groups  attempt  to  base  their 
legitimacy?  Sandhu  and  Wheatley  (1989:  1083)  note  that  from  the 
beginning,  “the  moderate4 PAP  leaders  had  recognized  that  their 
legitimacy would have to be underwritten by their performance.” The 
PAP and its coalition with global capital and the civil service could not, 
in other words, rely on any residue of tradition; their legitimacy would 
rest on instrumental grounds. More specifically, the “performance” of 
the  PAP  implied  two  major  accomplishments.  First  was  economic 
growth.  Singapore’s  success  in  achieving  growth  is  legendary:  the 
economy  grew  an  average  of  9%  a  year  between  1965  and  1990 
(Economist 1990: 19).
High  average  income,  of  course,  does  not  necessarily  imply 
benefits for everyone. A 1977 study conducted by Cheah Hock Beng, 
submitted  for  his  MSocSc  degree  at  the  National  University  of 
Singapore, found that poverty in Singapore had actually increased since 
independence.  Where  in  the  mid-1950s  approximately  25%  of  the 
Singapore  population  was  below  a  poverty  line  defined  in  terms  of 
subsistence-needs standards,  in  the  mid-1970s  the  figure  was  35%. 
(Pugh 1989: 849-50)
To  legitimate  itself  among  the  poorer  sections  of  Singapore 
4Several  commentators  refer  to  the  Lee  faction  of  the  PAP  as 
“moderates”, to distinguish them from the more radical socialist 
faction.  Given  the  party’s  division  at  the  time,  the  “moderate” 
label  made  some  sense  then,  although  the  authoritarian 
capitalism of the years that followed would make the same label 
very difficult to accept now.
society, the PAP relied primarily on providing social services. Since it 
had first been elected in 1959, the PAP had greatly increased spending 
on housing and education, and that spending quickly showed results, 
lending credibility to the PAP’s “ideological construction of a nation with 
common material interests” (Chua 1995: 16). Perhaps the only element 
constant in PAP policy since the party’s foundation has been these “real 
reforms of benefit to the working class” (Rodan 1989: 66).
The PAP did not attempt to rest its legitimacy on any connection 
to  Chinese  traditions,  in the  form of  Confucianism,  traditional  class 
arrangements or anything else. For the party took many actions against 
Chinese language and culture that would have been unthinkable for the 
Chinese-educated PAP of 1960. The Lee faction, after all, was entirely 
English-educated,  with  many  members  not  even  able  to  speak  a 
Chinese language. (Bellows 1970: 20) 
Concerned  about  the  island’s  economic  viability,  the  party 
institutionalized English widely as an everyday language. (Tham 1989: 
479)  Especially  after  its  dealings  with  the  Barisan,  the  government 
associated Chinese culture with pro-China sympathies, and thus with 
Communism.  (Kuo  1996:  302)  Both  to  attack  purported  Chinese 
Communism and to  attract  international  capital  through the  use  of 
English, the PAP in the 1970s systematically destroyed the network of 
Chinese schools which would have been the carriers of Chinese culture 
(Englehart 2000: 556). These PAP actions exaggerated an ongoing trend: 
whereas  before  the  1950s  students  in  Chinese-stream  schools 
outnumbered English- stream students by almost two to one, by 1954 
the enrollments had become about equal. With the PAP’s promotion of 
English,  by  1978  English-stream  students  outnumbered  Chinese-
stream students by nine to one (Hill and Lian 1995: 81).
In addition, the PAP government of the ‘60s and ‘70s encouraged 
“rugged individualism” among its citizens. Then-finance minister Goh 
Keng Swee had argued that the extended family system could obstruct 
growth because it would discourage hard work for people to share the 
fruits of their labours with family members. (Chua 1995: 27) Eddie Kuo 
(1987:  9)  notes  further  that  the  government  “had  to  attack”  some 
traditional values “essential to the Confucian family institution” (such 
as preference for a large family) in order to promote family planning. 
The new public  housing worked around such a principle:  it  isolated 
nuclear  families  from  their  extended  families  and  community  life 
(Tremewan 1994:  50).  The  PAP had,  in  short,  attacked the  Chinese 
cultural traditions that it would later claim to promote.
III. Crisis
In this chapter I trace the development of the conflict between 
accumulation and legitimation in the newly independent states of India 
and Singapore. I attempt to show how the Congress in India and the 
PAP  in  Singapore  tried  to  “modernize”  their  economies  in  order  to 
secure  both  accumulation  and  legitimation,  and  describe  how  this 
seemed increasingly difficult as the years went by and the old means of 
legitimation became more expensive in the face of new pressures for 
accumulation. 
As noted in the introduction, a key difference between India and 
Singapore is that India is a liberal democracy, while Singapore is not. 
Where  the PAP has long been able  to  secure  votes by coercion and 
monopoly,  the Congress never had this  luxury,  nor did other Indian 
parties that came to power. Therefore, the governments of the two states 
had to perceive declining legitimacy quite  differently.  Where in India 
discontent was manifested in riots, calls for military action and a long-
dominant party being ousted from power, Singapore had a few labour 
actions and the election of an opposition MP. These events presented a 
notable change from what had gone on before, however, which ruling 
parties in both countries saw as a sign of an eroding system legitimacy.
Diminishing caste authority
At  the  local  level,  projects  of  the  Congress  government  helped 
erode the traditional hierarchy of northern and western India. Over the 
past fifty years, Dumont’s five aspects of caste dominance (see  page ) 
declined in importance or were taken over by lower castes.
A.R.  Kamat  (1979:  350)  described the  economic  agenda of  the 
Indian  state  at  independence  in  1947  as  a  “programme  for  the 
advancement  of  capitalism...  but  interspersed  with  a  few  welfarish 
features going under the name of  socialism or socialistic pattern,  to 
propitiate the Left-oriented intelligentsia and the working class.” It was, 
in other words, an attempt at both accumulation and legitimation. And 
a chief effect of this agenda, I want to argue, was to diminish the power 
of  the  various  forms  of  upper-caste  dominance  (as  described  by 
Dumont).
A  key  ingredient  in  both  legitimation  and  (at  least  at  first) 
accumulation  was  land  reform.  Of  several  attempted  land  reform 
programs, the only one which can be considered in any way successful 
was the Zamindari Abolition program that took place in the early 1950s. 
Zamindari  Abolition’s  success  was  uneven  but  real.  The  zamindari 
system,  introduced  by  the  British  colonists,  granted  hereditary  and 
transferable  property rights over large landholdings to tax collectors, 
who  became  landholders  known  as  zamindars (Lele  1981:  40).  The 
zamindari system had existed mainly in northern India; as a result, the 
southern states were relatively unaffected. (Frankel 1978: 190)
The  zamindars were  the  official,  often  absentee,  landlords,  of 
dominant castes, who mediated the relations of provincial governments 
to villages. Their  middle- and lower-caste tenants, known by various 
names (such as jotedars), would till large tracts of the zamindars’ land. 
Where it was successful, Zamindari Abolition transferred control of the 
land from the  zamindars to  jotedar-type tenants, and transformed “a 
three-tier structure of domination involving the provincial government, 
zamindars,  and  village-level  jotedars into  essentially  a  two-tiered 
structure of government and jotedars.” (Kohli 1989: 407-8) 
Land  records  had  never  been  precise  or  accurate,  making  it 
difficult to establish exactly how much land changed hands, although 
the  government’s  Planning  Commission  believed  the  number  was 
substantial  (Frankel  1978:  191-2).  Ethnographic  studies  show 
considerable  results  for  the  1954  reform  in  Rajasthan:  in  Devisar 
village, Rajputs owned 84% of the land before the abolition of jagirdari5 
tenures, but only 29% after the abolition; most of the land had gone to 
the Jat, Kumavat and Ahir middle castes (Mendelsohn 1993: 812). Zoya 
Hasan (1989: 179) argues that although implementation of Zamindari 
Abolition reform was “half-hearted”, it nevertheless helped many former 
tenants (generally lower- and middle-caste) to become independent of 
their  (dominant  caste)  landlords,  and  to  mobilize  politically.  In  the 
north,  Zamindari  Abolition  diminished  (though  of  course  it  did  not 
eliminate) the “eminent right over land” that is Dumont’s first criterion 
of caste dominance.
Later  attempts  to  limit  the  wealth  of  jotedars and  southern 
landlords by passing land-ceiling legislation were not successful. The 
party announced the principle of imposing ceilings on land holdings in 
1953, but most states did not pass enabling legislation until 1960 or 
1961, giving landowners ample time to arrange partitions and transfers 
of  holdings  that  would  escape  any  new  laws.  In  many  states,  the 
5Rajasthan’s land tenure system was known as  jagirdari rather 
than  zamindari,  so  the  reform  there  was  known  as  Jagirdari 
Abolition, but the landholding system and the attempt to reform 
it were the same as elsewhere.
ceilings  proposed  were  high  enough  to  “defeat  the  aims  of  the 
legislation”, in the Planning Commission’s words; the vast majority of 
tenants held land from an owner with a holding below the official ceiling 
level.  (Frankel  1978:  192)  Nevertheless,  the  effects  of  Zamindari 
Abolition on some middle- and lower-caste peasants were real, lasting 
and important.
Several other government programs, Kamat’s “welfarish features”, 
provided lower castes with more economic opportunities. Under Indira 
Gandhi  in  the  early  1970s,  some  small  and  marginal  farmers  and 
landless  labourers  — by  and large  in  the  lower  castes  —  received 
subsidized  loans  from  cooperatives  or  nationalized  banks.  (Frankel 
1978:  522)  In  a  1971  program  called  the  Crash  Scheme  for  Rural 
Employment, Uttar Pradesh was allotted 70 million rupees to provide a 
job to at least one member of each family with a monthly income of 100 
rupees  or  less.  The  scheme  gave  lower  castes  (especially  Dalits) 
alternatives to their traditional subordination to landlords, as did the 
establishment of minimum wages (Hasan 1989: 189-91).
Education  has  also  provided  a  way  for  Dalits  to  secure 
employment. At independence, the Dalit leader Ambedkar had secured 
a  policy  of  reservations  (affirmative  action)  for  Dalits,  guaranteeing 
them a  certain  number  of  seats  in  government  and  places  in  post-
secondary education (Dirks 1997: 597-9). Stern (1993: 82) notes that so 
far education has tended “to create an untouchable bourgeoisie rather 
than to raise the general socio-economic level of scheduled castes”, but 
that it has nevertheless done a great deal to reduce the salience of caste 
as  a  basis  for  dominance.  Thus  Dumont’s  second  criterion  of 
dominance, the power of employment, lost much of its effectiveness. 
Also diminished was the third criterion, the power of justice, since 
the passing of the Indian Constitution made caste  panchayats “legally 
redundant” (Karanth 1996: 89-90). The fifth, connection with royalty, 
was reduced as the power of royalty in the country was itself reduced. 
In some parts of India, such as Rajasthan, rulers of old princely states 
had retained a good deal of power and independence even under the 
British. At independence this was reduced to a system of “privy purses” 
through which the old rulers received sums of compensation from the 
federal government; even these were abolished in the 1970s (Narain and 
Mathur 1978: 21).
Dumont’s  fourth  criterion,  political  monopoly,  was  weakened 
considerably by two factors. First, the rising rich peasants of the middle 
and lower OBC castes have been able to organize politically. They have 
supported a variety of different parties, but whether within Congress or 
outside it, they have clashed with the upper and other dominant castes. 
(See  the  next  section.)  Second,  Dalits  too  had  been  able  to  form  a 
“small, but highly vocal” political leadership as a result of reservations. 
(Sheth  1999:  2507)  Caste  consciousness  was  heightened  by  the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission (see glossary), proposed in 
the early 1980s but implemented only in 1990 under the National Front 
government (see page ), that OBCs also receive reservations. 
Stern (1993: 26) points out that political  participation of  lower 
castes  has  a  strong  effect  on  ritual  status  as  well,  affecting  even 
commensal relations: “High jati politicians who would win the votes of 
their lowest jati constituents must woo them over tea. Untouchable jati 
ministers, and there are many of them, expect invitations to dine from 
twice-born favor seekers.” 
In addition to facing these challenges to their rural hegemony, the 
dominant castes also became increasingly urban, and caste had less 
significance in urban areas. As well as their landholdings, dominant-
caste families often came to own urban businesses. They also often sent 
their  children  to  be  educated  at  urban  universities  and  join  the 
professions. (Desai 1999: 704) Lower-caste households, too, have come 
to  benefit  from “an  enormous  growth  in  the  number  and  variety  of 
urban occupations and their accessibility to villagers.” (Stern 1993: 37)
With all  these shifts — both shifts within the countryside and 
shifts toward the cities — the traditional ritual implications of caste are 
lost so much that the description of caste “as a system of ritual status 
hierarchy  has  lost  theoretical  meaning.”   (Sheth  1999:  2505)  Oliver 
Mendelsohn (1993: 808)  claims that  “innumerable conversations and 
interviews  I  have  had  over  the  years  with  untouchables  and  other 
persons in many different regions” convey irrefutably that “low caste 
and even untouchable villagers are now less beholden to their economic 
and ritual superiors than is suggested in older accounts.” As examples, 
he suggests that “untouchable women are less at the sexual beck-and-
call of local magnates than they used to be”, and that untouchable boys 
who have left villages to go to college will no longer accord high-caste 
men the ritual deference they once gave, such as squatting in the dust 
before them.  
For Mendelsohn (1993: 807), “land and authority have been de-
linked in village India” to the point that the concept of the dominant 
caste no longer has a meaning at all. The old leadership exercised by 
the dominant castes is thus no longer present, as:
caste survives, but as a kinship-based cultural community, 
not as a status group of the ritual hierarchy.... The ritually 
determined  vertical  relationship  of  statuses,  which 
encouraged harmony and co-operation among castes, has 
got transformed into that of horizontally competing, often 
conflicting power  blocs,  each constituted of  a  number of 
castes occupying different statuses across traditional local 
hierarchies. (Sheth 1999: 2508)
In other words, caste as a traditional ritually legitimating ideology 
has lost much of  its force because of changes in the composition of 
ruling groups as well as the rejection among subordinates. But this is 
certainly not to say that caste has become irrelevant, for:
upper caste individuals entering the middle class have at 
their  disposal  the  resources  that  were  attached  to  the 
status of their caste in the traditional hierarchy.  Similarly 
for  lower  caste  members,  lacking  in  traditional  status 
resources, their entry into the middle class is facilitated by 
the modern-legal provisions like affirmative action to which 
they are entitled by virtue of  their low traditional status. 
(Sheth 1999: 2509)
Thomas  Blom  Hansen  discusses  the  resulting  contemporary 
meaning  of  caste,  as  it  emerged  in  his  interviews  with  upper-caste 
families in Pune and Kalwa in Maharashtra: most now stated that caste 
was a thing of  the past,  but still  frequently spoke in terms of  caste 
somewhat  more  covertly,  “as  remarks  in  passing  on  the  essential 
character  of  certain  other  caste  groups,  on  cleanliness,  on  the 
‘atmosphere’  of  an  area,  and  so  on.”  (Hansen  1999:  145)  Ashutosh 
Varshney (2000: 12) notes that the English-language press in India, in 
general,  makes  similar  comments  about  “plebeian”  politics  in  recent 
years: that the language of politics has become more “coarse” and the 
style more “rough”, or that men of “dubious provenance” have taken 
over  electoral  politics,  for  example.  While  some  of  these  comments 
about politics may certainly refer to increases in corruption, I think they 
are likely also often code for the lower castes’ increasing assertiveness. 
The growth of  the BJP in the  past  twenty  years has  come with the 
simultaneous growth of Dalit and OBC political parties — and of violent 
acts against Dalits, which increased by 23.4% between 1981 and 1991 
(Devi 2000: 49). 
I submit that Hindutva is the political expression of a new form of 
caste ideology. For traditional upper caste members who have emerged 
as capitalist property owners, the old idiom of hereditary caste divisions 
as divinely sanctioned would be difficult to sustain. What replaces it is 
an  ideology  that  stresses  the  unity  of  “Hindu”  society  of  all  castes, 
allowing the kind of sublimated caste rhetoric that Hansen describes 
and  preventing  an  organized  challenge  along  caste  lines  to  the  real 
inequalities that continue to exist between caste groups. 
I  think  that  the  idea  of  a  caste  basis  of  Hindutva  also  helps 
explain its regional variations.  The most enthusiastic to embrace the 
Hindu cause have been the Brahmins and Banias,  and to a slightly 
lesser extent the Rajputs, all dominant in much of the north and west. 
The rising groups, the rich and middle peasants, have in those areas 
come  from  middle  castes  like  Jats  and  Yadavs  which  were  not 
traditionally  dominant.  In  the  south,  on  the  other  hand, the  castes 
dominant  in  rural  areas  before  independence,  such  as  Reddys  and 
Nairs, have ritually been considered Shudras (Varshney 2000: 11). So 
while  many  of  the  post-independence  changes  described  here  — 
urbanization and employment opportunities, for example — have also 
taken place in the south, they have not produced the kind of large-scale 
challenge to rural upper-caste dominance that occurred in the north, 
because  upper-caste  dominance  was  not  present  even  before  these 
changes (Washbrook 1989). Thus, on one hand, the southern dominant 
castes have less need for Hindutva as a way of preventing challenges to 
their authority. On the other, they are suspicious of a Brahmin-centred 
Hindutva movement aimed at the control of northern groups that are 
ritually Shudra like themselves.
Decline of the Congress
The  Congress’s  programs  for  legitimation  in  the  countryside 
began, by the early 1960s, to run afoul of the need for accumulation. 
Agricultural productivity showed few signs of increase, partially because 
of the failure to implement land reforms beyond Zamindari Abolition; 
the country’s overall rate of GDP growth was scarcely higher than its 
rate of population growth. The country could only pay for its five-year 
plans by means of large deficits. A costly military conflict with China in 
1962 worsened the budgetary situation further. (Frankel 1978: 214-17)
For these reasons, government spending on egalitarian programs 
soon began to decline. (Frankel 1978: 239-40) The retreat from social 
welfare accelerated with the death of its key advocate, Prime Minister 
Nehru, in 1964. (Frankel 1978: 246-7) 
At the same time, the rise of  the rich peasants in middle and 
lower castes had begun to threaten the Congress system in the north.6 
A  prominent  Uttar  Pradesh  Congress  politician,  Charan  Singh,  had 
begun advocating increased privileges for the peasantry, which did not 
sit  well  with  many  upper-caste  Congress  leaders.  One  of  these, 
6In the south, by contrast, the rural dominant castes had already 
been  middle  castes  with  relatively  large  proportions  of  rich 
peasants (see page ).
Sampurnanand,  argued  for  a  “continuation  of  the  upper  classes 
coalition in the Congress which will ensure its influence in rural areas”. 
(quoted in Hasan 1989: 177) Manor (1990: 72) notes that the increasing 
self-assertion  of  non-dominant  groups  meant  that  “[i]nterest  groups 
crystallized  and  came  increasingly  into  conflict,  so  that  it  became 
harder to operate a political machine that could cater to every organized 
interest, as Congress had very nearly done in the Nehru years.”
Nehru’s  death  exacerbated  the  difficulties  of  factionalism, 
because his skill at negotiation had helped hold the patronage network 
together and mediate between its various factions. His successors, Lal 
Bahadur Shastri and then Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi (in 1965), 
had considerably  more difficulty.  In the two years leading up to the 
1967  federal  election,  more  than  20%  of  all  legislators  in  the  nine 
largest states changed their party affiliation at least once (Lele 1981: 
153).
Largely as a result of the factional infighting and defections, the 
Congress lost 77 seats in the 1967 elections, although it still clung to a 
narrow  majority.  These  seats  included  those  of  several  Syndicate 
members. (Frankel 1978: 356) Charan Singh worsened the Congress’s 
troubles by leaving shortly afterwards to form a new party called the 
Bharatiya Kranti Dal or BKD (Hasan 1989: 180).
The poor electoral showing threw the Syndicate into disarray, and 
Indira7 took this opportunity to confront it. Dominant-caste Syndicate 
leaders had chosen her as party leader (and thus prime minister) in 
1966 with the expectation that she would be a transitional figure (Lele 
7It is conventional to refer to Indira Gandhi and her relatives by 
their first names, to distinguish them from each other (and from 
the Mahatma, who was unrelated to them.)
1994: 47-8). But with the Syndicate weakened, she was able to bypass 
it  and consolidate the party around her personal leadership, so that 
positions  in  all  levels  of  the  Congress  organization  were  “filled  by 
appointment from above rather than by election from below.” (Manor 
1990: 70) She secured enough allies to retain control of the process, 
since as prime minister she retained final decision-making power over 
patronage (Lele 1981: 151-2).
Indira’s actions eventually led to a split in the Congress, with the 
Syndicate  leading  a  party  called  the  Congress(O),  for  Organization, 
while Indira was in charge of the Congress(R), for Requisition (Frankel 
1978: 429). She turned for support in the new party to an increasingly 
vocal  group  of  younger  socialist  radicals  from the  former  Congress. 
(Frankel 1978: 389) As a result, in the 1971 election the two parties 
split on left-right ideological lines; the Congress(O) allied with the Jan 
Sangh while Indira’s Congress(R) ran on a campaign slogan of  garibi  
hatao,  “get  rid  of  poverty”.  The  Congress(R)  attempted  to  leave  the 
dominant castes out and form a new political coalition of lower castes 
(especially  Dalits)  and  Muslims.  The  Congress(R)  platform  was  also 
strongly  tied  to  Indira’s  personal  image  as  a  symbol  of  change, 
distributing millions of posters and badges imprinted with her picture. 
Indira personalized the conflict, repeating the slogan: “Some people say, 
get rid of Indira. I say, get rid of poverty.” (Frankel 1978: 452-4)
Indira’s new strategy paid off handsomely in the 1971 election. 
The Congress(R) received a larger share (43%) of the 1971 vote than the 
entire undivided Congress had received in 1967 (40.7%). The undivided 
Congress had won 283 seats in 1967, of which 221 remained loyal to 
the Congress(R)  at dissolution of parliament in 1970; in the ensuing 
election, the Congress(R) won 350 seats. (Frankel 1978: 455-6) 
But  any  mood of  triumph in  the  party  did  not  last.  Attempts 
Indira  made  to  implement  a  garibi  hatao strategy  ran  into  similar 
difficulties to those her father had faced, but Indira’s commitment to 
poverty alleviation was weaker than his. The most successful policies 
she implemented were largely symbolic,  such as the abolition of  the 
privy  purses  (see  p.   and  glossary).  Indira’s  government  tried  to 
introduce  stronger  land-ceiling  legislation,  but  this  again  contained 
numerous loopholes, and its effect was limited by the partitions and 
transfers of holdings that had taken place to avoid the first round of 
ceiling  legislation.  The  government  also  attempted  a  scheme  to 
distribute food grains publicly, but smuggling was widespread enough 
to  negate  its  benefits.  (Frankel  1978:  506-8)  Budgetary  deficits 
continued to increase, exacerbated by the 1971 war with Pakistan, a 
1972  drought,  and  the  1973  oil  price  shock.  (Frankel  1978:  514) 
Prabhat Patnaik (1992: 188) argues that in the period after 1971, “over 
large tracts of the country the bulk of the agricultural population got 
impoverished in absolute terms.”
Thus the welfare-state mode of legitimation continued to run into 
many of  the difficulties  described  by Habermas,  even though it  was 
based on rural rather than urban-industrial  programs. Moreover, the 
decline of the old dominant-caste patronage system produced its own 
difficulties.  The  new  party  officials  (including  state  chief  ministers) 
whom Indira appointed owed their position entirely to her; they were 
often political “outsiders” with no base of support to rely on. The new 
Congress had neither its old dominant-caste intermediaries to deliver 
the  peasant  vote  nor  a  grassroots  organization  to  generate  funds 
through small donations. So it instead came to depend increasingly on 
“black money” — contributions from smugglers (in exchange for political  
protection)  and large  business  houses  (by  threatening  to  nationalize 
them otherwise). (Frankel 1978: 475-6) Because of these difficulties, the 
Congress lost a number of  byelections in 1973. These defeats called 
Indira’s popularity into question. (Frankel 1978: 518)
Further difficulties were on the horizon. In early January 1974, 
students in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, protested rising food prices by setting 
fire to the college canteen and attacking the rector’s house. The chief 
minister  called  in  riot  police,  and  several  fights  between  police  and 
students  ensued.  In  solidarity  with  the  students,  the  unions  of 
Ahmedabad’s city and state employees called a general strike that shut 
the city down. Looting, arson and full-scale riots ensued, which soon 
spread elsewhere in the state. (Frankel 1978: 524-5) The protest forced 
Indira to dissolve Gujarat’s state assembly (Frankel 1978: 526-7).
The Gujarat uprising considerably deepened mistrust between the 
Congress and opposition groups, and eliminated any sense of shared 
consensus between them. Congress leaders accused their opponents of 
working  towards  a  fascist  dictatorship;  senior  opposition  leaders 
accused the prime minister of using police powers to bring the country 
toward  authoritarian  rule.  “Each  side”,  in  Frankel’s  words,  “became 
convinced  that  the  other  would  no  longer  abide  by  the  rules  of 
democratic politics.” (Frankel 1978: 527)
Opposition  forces  across  the  political  spectrum,  from  the  Jan 
Sangh  to  the  Communists,  began  in  1974  to  coalesce  around  the 
popular  figure  of  Jayaprakash  (JP)  Narayan.  An  aging  hero  of  the 
independence  movement,  Narayan  had  spent  the  years  since 
independence attempting to implement Mohandas Gandhi’s principles 
of sarvodaya (non-violent social transformation based on voluntary gifts 
of  land  from  the  rich  to  the  poor).  The  sarvodaya movement  had 
generally failed to accomplish its goals8, and this failure had convinced 
JP of the need for more radical change. He proclaimed the goal of “an 
allround revolution, political, economic, social, educational, moral and 
cultural.”  (Frankel  1978:  532)  The  “JP  Movement”  demanded  the 
removal of the state ministry in Bihar, which it considered corrupt, and 
allied  with  student  agitators  in  the  state  as  they  began  a  similar 
uprising  to  the  Gujarati  one.  JP  attracted  unprecedented  crowds  to 
rallies, making him an inspiring figure for the disparate groups opposed 
to  Congress  rule  that  wished  to  form a  united  alternative.  (Frankel 
1978: 533-4)
Civil disobedience, riots, widespread suspicion of the democratic 
system — Indira had more than enough reasons to perceive a crisis in 
the legitimacy of the Congress under her leadership. And the signs of 
discontent reached a breaking point on 12 June 1975, when a judge of 
the  Allahabad  High  Court  ruled  that  Indira  was  guilty  of  “corrupt 
practices”  under  Indian  election  law.  In  the  campaign  for  her 
constituency  in  1971,  the  judge  said,  Indira  had  authorized  a 
government  administrative  officer  to  carry  out  election  work  for  her 
8 There  were  several  reasons  for  sarvodaya’s  failure,  many  of 
them connected with the actions of the state. Srivastava (1986: 
285)  suggests  that  Gandhi’s  vision  of  self-reliant  egalitarian 
communities was incompatible with the structures of a modern 
nation-state, focused around planning, industrialization, market 
production and monetary income.  He suggests  further that,  in 
supporting the sarvodaya programs, the Indian state had actually 
managed  to  co-opt  them  and  use  them  for  purposes  of 
accumulation instead.
campaign while he was still working for the government, and also used 
the  services  of  local  officials  in  her  campaign  rallies;  these  were 
considered corrupt and illegal. This ruling invalidated her election as an 
MP and would have disallowed her from holding any elected office for 
the  following  six  years;  without  a  seat  in  Parliament,  Indira  could 
continue as prime minister for only six more months. And as a further 
blow to Indira, on the same day, an alliance of four opposition parties — 
the Jan Sangh, the Congress (O) and two socialist parties — defeated 
the Congress in a Gujarat state election.  (Frankel 1978: 539-40) In a 
massive Delhi rally on 25 June, Narayan announced a joint plan of the 
opposition  parties  to  hold  a  nationwide  satyagraha (Gandhian 
nonviolent resistance protest) to demand Indira’s resignation (Frankel 
1978: 543). He even asked the army to oust her in a coup (Vanaik 1990: 
93). Here, I think, the signs of a crisis in Indira’s legitimacy were as 
clear as could be, and the Congress party had become so closely tied to 
her personality that its legitimacy was equally implicated.
The  night  of  25  June,  Indira  took  action.  She  signed  a 
proclamation declaring a nationwide state of emergency, and by 6:00 
the next morning, the major opposition leaders had been arrested. At 
8:00 AM she explained her decision on All India Radio as a response to 
“the deep seated and widespread conspiracy which has been brewing” 
to unseat her. (Frankel 1978: 545) The declaration of emergency, she 
said,  was  necessary  to  “save  the  country  from  chaos  and  total 
breakdown”  (quoted  in  Vanaik  1990:  93).  Without  Indira  and  her 
Congress, it seemed, the country would enter “total breakdown”. The 
Congress party president,  D.K. Barooah, expressed this sentiment in 
his slogan “Indira is India and India is Indira” (quoted in Frankel 1978: 
541-2). A crisis for the Congress was a crisis for India.
During  the  Emergency  period  (1975-77),  Indira  also  imposed 
heavy constraints on civil  liberties,  banning the publication of  many 
periodicals  and  allowing  further  arbitrary  preventive  detention  (Zins 
1989:  156-60).  Moreover,  she  liberalized  the  Indian  economy 
considerably. The government liberalized investment policy, relaxed the 
system of  licenses  for  the  production  of  consumer  goods,  weakened 
anti-monopoly  legislation,  encouraged  foreign  investment  and  more. 
(Zins 1989: 154)
On 18 January 1977, Indira ended the Emergency and called a 
new election, simultaneously releasing political detainees and relaxing 
press censorship. This gave the opposition a major disadvantage: it had 
only fifty days to organize and recover from a period where repression 
had made opposition political activity very difficult. The election looked 
like  one  that  Indira  could  win  —  but  she  didn’t.  Disgust  at  the 
Emergency  tactics  ran  high  enough  for  opposition  politicians  of  all 
stripes  — Congress(O),  the  Communist  Parties,  the  Jan  Sangh  and 
others — to unite as the Janata Party. This party won a resounding 
two-thirds  majority  in  parliament,  giving  the  Congress  its  first-ever 
national defeat. (Frankel 1978: 570-3) 
The  old  post-independence  “Congress  system”,  already  largely 
gone  under  Indira,  was  now  officially  dead.  But  it  had  been  the 
foundation  of  India’s  political  structure,  the  preeminent  means  by 
which  the  Indian  government  had secured  legitimation.  What  would 
replace it?
The PAP perceives declining legitimacy
Given  Singapore’s  authoritarian  political  environment,  any 
protest  that  could  emerge  would  necessarily  be  muted,  especially 
relative to more open countries like India.  But by the late ‘70s, the 
people of Singapore, both working and middle class, seemed to show 
signs of an increasing level of assertiveness. A key figure was the labour 
leader  Phey  Yew  Kok,  who  by  1979  had  emerged  as  the  head  of 
Singapore’s two largest unions, the “omnibus unions” known by their 
acronyms SILO and PIEU, with a strong grassroots support behind him. 
Phey had reportedly vowed to challenge the PAP-appointed Lim Chee 
Onn  as  head  of  the  National  Trades  Union  Congress  (NTUC),  the 
umbrella  organization  for  labour  groups  (Rodan  1989:  157). 
Remembering the former power of the unions in the old PAP and the 
Barisan, the government saw this as a threat; in late 1979, it charged 
Phey with six counts of criminal breach of trust and contravention of 
the Trade Union Act — a tactic similar to those it would use on elected 
opposition members in the ensuing decades — and he fled the country 
(Smith 1982: 58-9).
Although  Phey  did  not  directly  challenge  the  government,  his 
building of a power base independent of the PAP offered unprecedented 
potential for such a challenge.  Within a year, in 1980, a middle-class 
union presented a more direct challenge, in the form of a work-to-rule 
campaign by the Singapore International Air Pilot’s Association (Rodan 
1989:  159),  resisting  the  government’s  “nonconfrontational”  labour 
policy.
In  February  1981,  First  Deputy  Minister  Goh  Keng  Swee 
suggested  that  teachers’  unions  change  themselves  into  professional 
associations, because “the need to strike had not, does not and will not 
arise, nor the occasion to do so be allowed to happen”. In the following 
month, new membership in the Singapore Teachers’ Union doubled. A 
union official argued this membership increase was because teachers 
now saw the  need for  a  union and a  show of  solidarity  after  Goh’s 
speech. (Wong 1983: 268)
Shortly  afterwards,  on  May  Day  in  1981,  Lee  remarked  in  a 
speech  that  “The  Singaporean  is  an  individual  achiever.  The 
Singaporean must now learn to be a team achiever.”  This remark is 
often cited as an example of the government’s desire to “curb the urge 
to  self-gratification  without  concern  for  other  people”  (Hill  and  Lian 
1995: 201). But it is well worth noting the context in which Lee made 
this remark:
Workers’  interests  and  their  children’s  future  are  not 
advanced by more strikes and go-slows to squeeze more out 
of  the  employers.  The  time  has  come  for  us  to  make  a 
qualitative change in work attitudes. The Singaporean is an 
individual achiever. The Singaporean must now learn to be 
a team achiever. He must realize that he achieves more for 
himself  by working smoothly in a team to help the team 
succeed.  (Quoted in Kwok 1983: 80)
I  think  that  Lee’s  speech  sheds  a  new  light  on  standard, 
sympathetic explanations of  the promotion of  Confucianism, such as 
this  one:  “the  government  began  to  be  concerned  with  the  adverse 
effects  of  heightened individualism,  leading –  as it  believed –  to  the 
erosion of moral and ethical values on the one hand and on the other to 
the  loss  of  cultural  identity.”  (Tham  1989:  482)  When  reading  the 
government’s explanations of its promotion of Confucianism (and later 
“Asian values”) one is struck by two features: on one hand, continued 
denunciation  of   “individualism”  and  “materialism”  (nearly  always 
associated with the West), and on the other, a marked lack of specific 
examples  of  this  individualism  or  of  the  “moral  and  ethical  values” 
whose decline it is supposed to imply. I think Lee’s speech suggests why 
such examples are often lacking: by individualism, Lee refers to people 
demanding  a  fairer  share  of  Singapore’s  prosperous  but  unequal 
economy. 
Notably,  Lee  also  argued  strongly  against  public  welfare 
provisions  in  this  speech,  insisting  that  “any  public  welfare  system 
which  protects  everyone  against  all  risks  of  hardship  or  deprivation 
must  inevitably bring  about  a  decline  in  effort  and in productivity.” 
(Quoted in Kwok 1983: 79) According to Rodan (1989: 163), this was 
“the first indication that he had become concerned about the extent of 
Singapore’s own welfare programmes.”
Why this concern? The government was becoming less effective at 
providing subsidized public housing, so often trumpeted as a sign of its 
economic success. Housing prices increased dramatically between 1979 
and 1982, at a rate between 15% and 38% (Pugh 1989: 849). And why 
were prices rising? The housing program had become, to some extent at 
least, a victim of its own success. Private housing — which had had 
several  advantages  for  its  inhabitants,  even  in  the  “slums”  —  had 
become  nonexistent,  except  for  the  rich  (Tremewan  1994:  50-3). 
Without private housing available, the government was now obligated to 
meet  all new housing demand. And since homelessness would pose a 
severe challenge to a legitimacy that rested on the provision of housing, 
the Housing Development Board could not evict people with nowhere 
else to go. Since those who fell into arrears on rent could not be evicted, 
the  government  faced  increasingly  large  (though  unpublicized)  costs 
from  arrears  (Hill  and  Lian  1995:  129).  One  government  minister 
admitted that “the construction sector today is overheated” (Tan 1982: 
66).
The  world  recession  of  the  early  ‘80s  further  complicated  the 
government’s  ability  to  provide  services.  On  the  first  day  of  1982, 
Singapore’s largest manufacturer of refrigerators and air conditioners 
retrenched 138 of its 170 production workers because of weak domestic 
and  overseas  demand;  in  general,  Singapore  businesses  expected 
reduced business in 1982 because of the world recession. (Chiew 1983: 
249) This reduction would, no doubt, diminish tax revenue.
The clearest sign of protest yet also emerged a few months before 
the government began the Confucianism campaign. In October 1981 the 
Workers’  Party  candidate,  Joshua  Benjamin  Jeyaretnam,  won  a 
byelection  in  the  low-income,  working-class  constituency  of  Anson, 
becoming the first opposition member of Parliament since 1968. [Rodan 
1989: 166-7)
The PAP leadership reacted to its loss of a single seat with the 
kind of soul-searching analysis that one might normally associate with 
a party that lost the whole government. On 17 November, Lee made a 
long speech about the Anson byelection to a meeting of PAP MPs. A 
month later,  the speech was published as a three-part  series  in the 
Straits Times newspaper, getting front-page billing each day.
Lee claimed in the speech that “it is an unfortunate misadventure 
to have lost Anson”, although “it may not be without several blessings.” 
(Lee 1981a) He explained further what a shock Jeyaretnam’s election 
had been: 
It is painful to suffer the jolt of PAP’s first by-election defeat 
in  15  years  since  1966.  I  have  seen  the  by-election 
committee after the defeat. They have been through a minor 
trauma. They will be none the worse for it.... They will learn 
to persuade people. For Singapore to survive, Singaporeans 
have to face troubles together, to overcome them together, 
and to achieve a better life for all. (Lee 1981b)
He then outlined the way in which he felt  an opposition could 
pose a threat to the system:
There  is  a  younger  generation  that  has  not  known  real 
hardship.  Some  of  them  believe,  perhaps  sincerely,  that 
Singapore  needs  an  opposition....  In  the  next  few  years, 
they will learn that an opposition, if we are lucky, makes no 
difference  to  good  government.  Unfortunately,  they  may 
well discover, at great cost, that if we are unlucky, like most 
developing countries, an opposition can make for confusion 
by raising false expectations of unattainable benefits from 
greater  welfare  spending,  as  in  Britain  and  in  so  many 
Third World countries. Instead of sound planning and hard 
work  to  achieve  the  progress  of  these  countries,  these 
opposition groups raise false hopes of easy giveaways from 
an imaginary pie. (Lee 1981b)
Such opposition demands for  welfare spending,  Lee  continued, 
had caused “bedlam and chaos” in India and Sri Lanka. He cited the 
invoking of emergency powers by Indira Gandhi, as well as Sri Lankan 
President Jayewardene. (Lee 1981b)
Jeyaretnam, then, was seen as a major threat to the legitimacy of 
the PAP and the Singapore political  system,  despite  the  lack of  any 
other opposition MPs in Parliament. I think the PAP’s reaction to his 
election should be seen in the context of  the labour unrest  and the 
difficulties with housing provision in the years immediately preceding 
his  election.  PAP  leaders  had  been  worried  that  their  legitimacy 
depended on services that  were increasingly difficult  to provide;  and 
now,  they  felt,  they  knew  for  sure.  Lee  (1981a,  1981b)  identified 
housing issues as the major reason for the PAP’s election loss.
The PAP soon tightened political control over the media, which it 
had  perceived  as  sympathetic  to  Jeyaretnam.  In  February  1982  it 
appointed S.R. Nathan, a longtime PAP civil servant and former Defence 
Ministry Chief Secretary, to head the Straits Times Press corporation. 
Shortly  afterwards  it  merged  the  two  Chinese  presses  into  a  single 
holding company; in 1984 it would merge this company together with 
the Straits Times Press. (Rodan 1989: 168-9)
Jeyaretnam  himself  was  subjected  to  a  long  campaign  of 
persecution.  In  the  three  years  after  Jeyaretnam’s  election  the  PAP 
government charged him with breach of parliamentary privilege, making 
false  statements  about  party  accounts,  and  fraud.  He  was  fined 
multiple times for these, and ultimately served a prison sentence, which 
disqualified him from running for Parliament for five years. He was also 
disbarred  as  a  lawyer,  until  an  appeal  to  the  British  Privy  Council 
reinstated him; shortly after this, Parliament amended the constitution 
to abolish appeals to the Privy Council. When Jeyaretnam questioned 
the independence of the judiciary in 1986 — hardly unreasonable given 
what he was going through — Lee described his comments as “totally 
treasonable”, and the government pressed further charges against him 
for libel. (Tremewan 1994: 206-8)
In addition, the PAP appointed two of its own MPs to “take care of 
the problems faced by the people of Anson.” PAP sources quoted in the 
Straits Times claimed that this appointment was “to demonstrate to the 
residents that they have not been deserted by the PAP”, adding that this 
was “in line with the party’s campaign to win back Anson.”  The Times 
article  reported  with  some bemusement  that  Anson  residents  would 
“soon  enjoy  the  distinction  of  being  the  only  group  of  voters  in 
Singapore  to  be  served  by  three  MPs.”  (Osman 1981)  This  action,  I 
think,  also demonstrates the lack of distinction between system and 
party — only PAP MPs could deal with constituents’ concerns within the 
PAP’s  system,  so  if  the  constituents  wouldn’t  elect  a  PAP  MP 
themselves, they needed to have one assigned.
The party responded to voter concerns on the housing issue by 
reducing its increases in housing prices in the following years. But it 
felt this was not enough. It expected a shortfall  in land available for 
housing, further stretching its ability to provide that service. So surely 
it is unlikely a coincidence that one of the key Confucian virtues the 
government  promoted  was  filial  piety  —  and  that  one  of  the  key 
measures of filial piety for it was supporting one’s parents by allowing 
them to move in. “Anyone brought up in the Confucianist tradition”, 
said Lee (1982), “will be ashamed to let his or her old parents live by 
themselves  in  loneliness  and  desolation.”  Workers’  supporting  their 
parents  took  on  added  significance  in  the  face  of  the  “greying  of 
Singapore”,  a  demographic  trend  familiar  to  the  West:  population 
projections  indicated  that  people  60  and  over,  less  than  7% of  the 
Singapore population in 1980, would make up 10.3% of the population 
in 2000 and 22.2% by 2030 (Mattar 1982: 104).
But there was a larger issue at work in promoting Confucianism. 
Other services, such as health care, were also facing spiralling costs, 
again connected to the aging of the population (Rodan 1989: 165). The 
government needed to assure itself that it could still rule even if it was 
no longer quite as successful at “delivering the goods”. The promotion of 
Confucianism, I argue, was a means to this end.
I  think  that  the  government  was  worried  about  its  legitimacy 
among working Singaporeans of both the middle class and the working 
class. In general,  it  has been the working class,  and not the middle 
class, which has been outspoken in challenging PAP hegemony directly, 
as  demonstrated  by  Jeyaretnam’s  election  in  a  working-class 
constituency. While the working class was more politically assertive, the 
middle class, including pilots and teachers, was the more assertive in 
the  workplace.  But  working  people  of  both classes  expressed  less 
willingness to accept the terms of transnational corporations and the 
government to which they were allied — although the government was 
much harsher in its treatment of the working class.
The people of both the working and middle classes, importantly, 
were of  predominantly  Chinese origin.  In  all occupational  categories, 
Singapore  Chinese  outnumbered  the  Malays,  Indians  and  “others” 
combined, by a factor of at least two to one (Chiew 1991: 155). Thus a 
Chinese-oriented ideology like Confucianism held promise for keeping 
labour in its place.
IV. The political constructions
We  have  seen  that  the  leaders  of  the  Congress  and  the  PAP 
perceived their legitimacy as being in crisis by the end of the 1970s. In 
the ensuing years, the two ruling parties would each come to promote 
the ideology of a cultural tradition. I argue in this chapter that the latter 
events followed from the former. 
In  the  late  1970s,  some  Western  scholars  argued  that 
Confucianism had created a docile,  obedient workforce in Japan and 
the “Four Dragons” of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
and  that  this  “Confucian”  workforce  was  a  central  factor  in  these 
countries’ economic growth. In other words, they found Confucianism to 
aid both accumulation and legitimation. Their arguments convinced Lee 
Kuan Yew to promote Confucianism in order to maintain his  party’s 
legitimacy.
Hindutva came out of a grassroots movement expressed in the 
Jan Sangh and BJP.  But the Congress party,  too,  took it  up in the 
1980s — a direct result, I argue, of the party’s earlier electoral collapse. 
Indira’s  attempt  to  replace  the  old  dominant-caste  Congress  system 
with an electoral coalition of the poor had not worked. The symbols of 
Hindutva appeared as a way to secure the power of the upper castes 
while uniting the lower castes behind them.
The growth of Hindutva
Hindutva had been a marginal political force in India until  the 
early 1980s. Members of the Jan Sangh became cabinet ministers in 
the Janata Party government, but that government was formed around 
the single issue of ending Indira’s authoritarianism. It collapsed in the 
following election of 1980, which returned Indira to power. The Janata 
Party  did  not  seem  to  offer  a  viable  replacement  for  the  Congress 
system.
Shortly after the 1980 election, former Jan Sangh members left 
the Janata Party to form the BJP. Its first leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee 
(now prime minister), tried to hold on to the support base of the Janata 
Party  by  adopting  slogans  of  Gandhian  socialism and continuing  to 
downplay  the  Hindutva  agenda  (Brass  1997:  2404).  But  the  BJP 
suffered an even more humiliating defeat in the first election it faced, in 
1984, when it won only two seats.
Such a  result  makes it  all  the  more  striking  that  in  the  next 
federal election, in 1989, the BJP would not only recoup its losses but 
become the third-largest party in the federal house. (See table 3.) From 
there, it continued to expand, in 1990 forming the state government in 
Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (when neither the 
BJP nor the Jan Sangh had ever formed the government of any state 
before) and increasing its federal representation still further in the 1991 
election. And during this period, under the leadership of L. K. Advani, it 
was running on a strong Hindu nationalist platform.
Table  3:  the  Jan  Sangh  and  BJP  in  Indian  elections  since  the 
founding of the Jan Sangh
Elec
tion 
Government 
formed by
Hindutva party Seats won by 
Hindutva 
% of popular 
vote for 
year party Hindutva party
1952 Congress Jan Sangh 3 3.1
1957 Congress Jan Sangh 4 5.9
1962 Congress Jan Sangh 14 6.4
1967 Congress Jan Sangh 35 9.4
1971 Congress (I) Jan Sangh 22 7.4
1977 Janata Party (Janata Party) 294 41.3
1980 Congress (I) (Janata Party) 31 19
1984 Congress BJP 2 7.4
1989 National Front BJP 85 11.4
1991 Congress BJP 119 19.9
1996 United Front BJP 161 20.7
1998 BJP BJP 182 25.5
1999 BJP BJP 182 23.1
Sources: Jaffrelot 1993: 513; Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998: 15 and 324; 
ECI 1998; Ghosh 1999: 3341.
With the BJP’s rise came another shift in Indian politics that was 
in some ways even more surprising: the post-1980 Congress had itself 
begun  to  use  Hindutva  ideology.  The  garibi  hatao (abolish  poverty) 
platform  had  temporarily  secured  the  Congress  a  winning  electoral 
coalition  of  religious  minorities  and  disadvantaged  groups.  But  the 
liberalization undertaken during the emergency would have made the 
use  of  such  a  strategy  increasingly  difficult.  After  her  loss  in  1977 
election, Indira Gandhi began to look for a new electoral coalition for 
her party — now so centred around her personal leadership that the 
Congress(R) had been officially renamed the Congress(I), for Indira. She 
began  to  use  the  language  and  symbols  of  Hindu  communalism9, 
9“Communal”  and  “communalism”  in  India  refer  to  conflict 
between “religious communities”.
arguing that this was in “retaliation to Muslim communalism”. 
She also attacked the Sikh minority. In 1984, when militant Sikh 
leaders stockpiled arms in the holiest Sikh religious site,  the Golden 
Temple, Indira ordered troops to storm the temple, thus desecrating it. 
In revenge, Indira’s own Sikh bodyguards assassinated her. Anti-Sikh 
riots soon followed in Delhi. (Stern 1993: 182)
Indira was succeeded in 1984 by her son Rajiv, who continued 
supporting  a  Hindu  nationalist  agenda.  He  played  to  anti-Muslim 
sentiment through sabre-rattling against Pakistan. As a consequence, 
the RSS, a militant Hindu youth organization which has generally had 
close ties to the BJP and Jan Sangh, threw its support to Congress; this 
was one reason for the BJP’s shoddy performance. (Hasan 1998: 193)
Central  in Rajiv’s  support  for  Hindutva would prove  to be  the 
dispute over the Babri Masjid, a 15th-century mosque in the small Uttar 
Pradesh city of Ayodhya.  The mosque was built by Muslims on a site 
which many believed was the birthplace of the deity Rama, although 
there  was  no  archeological  evidence  for  any  such  claim  (Srivastava 
1991). In 1985, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindu religious 
organization in the Sangh Parivar, began agitating for the mosque to be 
destroyed and a Rama temple to be built in its place.10 
The Congress accepted some of the VHP’s demands, establishing 
a centre for the study of the Ramayana (the epic of Rama) in Ayodhya 
and developing and beautifying places mentioned in the epic,  among 
other steps. Most importantly, the Congress state government of Uttar 
Pradesh was instrumental in allowing the Babri Masjid to be opened for 
10The VHP, it should be noted, raises much of its money from 
Indians living in Britain and North America (Anderson 1998: 73).
the worship of Rama inside. (Hasan 1996: 92) To top it off, Rajiv began 
his  1989  election  campaign  in  Ayodhya,  with  a  promise  to  bring 
ramrajya (the rule of Rama) to India, and allowed Hindu activists to lay 
the foundation stone of the new temple at the disputed site.  (Gupta 
1990: 44) 
The  Congress’s  main  concession  to  Muslims  (often  considered 
part of an explicit deal made with Muslim leaders in exchange for the 
unlocking of the temple) was to lend support to Muslim fundamentalism 
by changing family laws.  A 1956 law allowed women identified legally 
as Hindus to inherit and seek recourse through civil courts. In 1985, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman, Shah Bano, 
could also use this recourse to obtain maintenance support from her 
former  husband.  In 1986 the  government passed an act  that  would 
reverse such verdicts, establishing a separate family law for Muslims. 
(Freitag  1996:  224-5)  This  last  move  lent  considerable  ideological 
strength to the BJP, who began to argue that the Hindus were the “true 
secularists”.  Combined  with  the  provocative  actions in  Ayodhya,  the 
approach  more  generally  did  a  great  deal  to  sharpen  communal 
divisions. 
In the event, the Hindu strategy did not work for the Congress. 
For  on  one  hand,  those  who  agreed  with  a  Hindu  agenda  felt, 
reasonably, that they would be better served by the BJP itself, which 
had  advocated  Hindutva  more  strongly.  On  the  other,  the  strategy 
alienated the Muslims, who had supported the Congress at least since 
the  ‘70s;  the  Shah  Bano  case  did  little  to  convince  them  that  the 
increasingly Hindutva-oriented Congress had their  interests  in mind. 
The former voted BJP, the latter for the Janata Dal party formed by the 
more left-wing elements of the Janata Party coalition. The left-leaning 
National Front coalition, led by the Janata Dal, won the 1989 elections 
supported by Muslims and Dalits who had left the Congress. The BJP 
emerged as the third largest party in parliament, so that the Janata Dal 
depended on its support to run a minority government.
In the 1989 election, BJP support increased sharply in several 
states  including  Madhya  Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Rajasthan  and 
especially Gujarat. The growth of its support in Uttar Pradesh appeared 
not in 1989 but in 1991, where it not only quadrupled its share of the 
federal  vote,  but  took  power  in  the  state  government.  (See  table  1, 
page  .)  This  triumph  followed  a  massively  publicized  rath  yatra 
(procession) through India in support of constructing the Rama temple, 
led by Advani, the BJP’s leader. The procession was hotly contested, 
leading  to  widespread  riots.  On  30  October  1990,  militants  in  the 
procession  attacked  the  disputed  mosque.   In  order  to  repel  them, 
police opened fire — but in doing so they triggered further anti-Muslim 
riots and made martyrs of the militants.  (Jaffrelot 1998b: 81-3) 
The  militants’  martyrdom certainly  did  not  hurt  the  Hindutva 
cause.  But why did the  rath yatra have  such an appeal  in the first 
place?  How did it lead to such an upsurge in BJP support? Moreover, 
why would Hindu nationalism appear as the best legitimating strategy 
for the new Congress?
Explaining Hindutva politics
Why did the Gandhis adopt a Hindutva platform when they did? I 
suggest,  again,  that  this  was  a  reaction  to  a  perceived  crisis  of 
legitimacy.  I  think  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  Indira  and  Rajiv 
continued to see the party in its traditional position of the spokesperson 
for all India, and thus to see the party’s legitimacy as inseparable from 
that of the Indian political system. As James Manor (1988: 82) put it, 
“some Congressmen tend to see the party and the nation as identical 
[and] tend to see opposition forces as antinational.”
We see some evidence of this equation of party and country in 
Rajiv’s  speeches.  He  claimed  that  opposition  parties  were  “receiving 
assistance from certain foreign powers, which were interested in making 
India weak” and that conferences of opposition leaders “had sown the 
seeds of poison” that endangered national unity. The Janata Party, he 
said,  “was  working  hard  to  divide  the  country”  and  “shielding 
extremists”; he described two of its prominent members as collaborators 
with Pakistan. (Manor 1988: 83) Congress advertisements stressed that 
the order of the country would fall  apart  without the Congress.  One 
claimed that when government lacks firmness:
Vipers crawl out of their holes, predators prowl the streets 
and  seemingly  normal  citizens  take  off  their  masks  and 
shuffle in the shadows, waiting for the hour of the gun. The 
hour of acid bulbs, iron bars and daggers... Your vote can 
stop  your  groceries  list  turning  into  an  arms  inventory. 
Your vote can make all the difference. Between order and 
chaos. Give Order a Hand. (quoted in Manor 1988: 84)
Moreover, the Congress’s previous strategies of legitimating itself 
as a party — relying on providing welfare-state services, either through 
the Congress  system or  at  the  more general  level  of  garibi  hatao — 
seemed like they would no longer work. As discussed on page , slow 
growth deprived the government of tax revenue. The Congress staved off 
a severe fiscal crisis only by taking a large IMF loan in 1982 (Lele 1994: 
60). To achieve growth the party continued to pursue a liberalization 
agenda,  deemphasizing  the  programs  for  improvement  of  rural 
economic conditions that had been important for legitimation before. 
The economy did grow — a rate of 5% annually, as opposed to a rate in 
previous years that barely cracked 3% (Kohli 1990b: 13) — but those 
who  had  depended  on  government  help  and  government  schemes 
suffered as these were cut back. Manor (1988: 85) notes that “next to 
no serious attempts were made by the authorities during [Indira’s] last 
premiership to develop carefully designed social programs.” I think that 
Congress  Hindutva  was  directly  tied  to  the  party’s  promotion  of 
economic liberalization. Atul Kohli describes the logic of the connection 
well:
in a poor democracy like India, how does one mobilize the 
support of the majority, who are after all very poor? One 
solution to this puzzle was to cut the majority-minority pie 
at a different angle. If  the poor were the majority by the 
criteria  of  wealth,  Hindus  were  the  religious  majority. 
Appeals  to  the  majority  religious  community  against 
minority communities, then, can be an alternate strategy 
for seeking electoral majorities by downplaying class issues 
in favor of communal ones. (Kohli 1994: 90)
The class issues of which Kohli speaks, I think, are inseparable 
from caste issues. It does not seem possible to me to adequately explain 
the rise of the BJP, or more generally of Hindutva, without referring to 
caste divisions, to which I now turn.
In  the  north,  many Dalits  (although not  a  majority  or  even  a 
plurality)  voted  BJP,  somewhat  surprisingly  since  they  “have  little 
interest in building temples controlled by Brahman priests who do not 
want them as clients and would rather they stayed away” (Brass 1993: 
269). But they also tend to live in the poorer areas of cities, side by side 
with Muslims, where riots were frequent. Dalits typically turned to the 
BJP to help ensure a sympathetic response if Hindu-Muslim riots were 
to break out (Brass 1993: 269). In 1996, when communal riots had died 
down, fewer than 10% of the Dalits had voted BJP (Brass 1997: 2408). 
The practice of deliberate “social engineering”, giving them a place in 
the party, also mattered, as one Gujarati Dalit pointed out: “the BJP 
subscribes to brahminical ideology but the Congress is in practice no 
way  different.  Moreover  I  worked  in  the  Congress  for  more  than 10 
years but I did not get a position whereas the BJP has given me a party 
position.”  (Shah 1991: 2923)
Jaffrelot (1998a: 52-3) suggests another reason for some lower-
caste participation in the BJP: a desire for Sanskritization (see page ). 
Joining Hindutva organizations is seen as a way to Sanskritize precisely 
because it has widely been considered an upper-caste thing to do.
For it was the northern upper castes, above all, who voted BJP in 
large numbers in 1989 and 1991. As mentioned, they had been the 
most likely to vote Jan Sangh before, but nevertheless a great many of 
them  had  long  voted  Congress.  In  1989  and  1991,  these  Congress 
voters switched their support to the BJP, and it is widely suggested that 
this was in reaction to the implementation of the Mandal Commission’s 
recommendations. (Brass 1993: 266) In 1991 national exit polls, 59.2% 
of Brahmins, 49.6% of Banias, and 41.1% of Kshatriyas said they had 
voted BJP — compared to 34.9% of OBCs, 23.5% of SCs and STs, and 
3.4%  of  Muslims  (Butler,  Lahiry  and  Roy  1995:  11).  I  think  upper 
castes’  turn to the BJP should be seen in the larger context  I  have 
discussed of the increasing self-assertion of middle and lower castes.
In the south, by contrast, OBCs had been dominant since before 
the  colonial  period,  as  mentioned.  There  were  few  Banias  or  neo-
Kshatriyas  to  speak of.  Brahmins — numerically  very small  — were 
influential primarily in the towns, and it was this urban influence that 
the DMK aimed to combat,  not  any rural  dominance (Frankel  1990; 
Washbrook  1989).  When the  DMK came to  power  in  1967 in  Tamil 
Nadu, its major anti-Brahmin act was to reserve 25% (and later 50%) of 
government  jobs  for  non-Brahmins.  Rather  than  try  to  fight  back 
against the reduction of opportunity this implied (as the more powerful 
northern  Brahmins  have  done),  many  Tamil  Brahmins  simply  left, 
migrating to Delhi, Bombay, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
where  their  high  levels  of  education  often  served  them  very  well. 
(Varshney 2000: 19) After implementing the reservations, the DMK took 
few  further  anti-Brahmin  measures.  It  stressed  issues  of  Tamil 
nationalism, implicitly including the remaining Tamil Brahmins within 
the fold. Overall, the entry of the non-Brahmin movement into politics 
did not create a confrontation between Brahmins and non-Brahmins. 
(Frankel 1990: 244-5) In Kerala, the class- and caste-based conflict that 
led to the creation of the Communist Party was between the Shudra 
Nairs and the Scheduled Caste Ezhavas; Brahmins were not at issue 
(Varshney 2000: 7).
The state of Rajasthan provides an interesting case study, for the 
Sangh Parivar ingeniously modified Hindutva there to suit the state’s 
specificities. Rajasthanis had had little interest in symbols like Rama 
that successfully mobilized people in the Hindi belt. But the regional 
identity  of  Rajasthan  had  long  been  associated  with  attributes  of 
martial acumen and valour, often called the “Rajput ethic”. The Rajput 
ethic corresponded very well with the sort of aggressive nationalism that 
the Sangh Parivar promotes. Thus Rajasthan could be portrayed as “the 
preserver  of  the  true  faith,  of  the  assertive,  self-confident,  martial 
tradition  of  Hinduism”  which  had  been  weakened  elsewhere  in  the 
country by Muslim and Western influences. (Jenkins 1998: 104-5)
Rajasthani  BJP  members  assert  the  value  of  traditional  caste 
hierarchy  far  more  explicitly  than  do  BJP  members  elsewhere, 
describing the benevolence of old Rajput rule. BJP candidates’ speeches 
frequently  claimed  that  Rajput  princes  in  18th-century  Jaipur  had 
elevated  members  of  lower  castes  to  important  posts  in  their 
administration, the intended message being that the rule of Rajputs had 
been (and would continue  to  be)  based on a  sense  of  fair  play  and 
respect for talent. One campaign worker interviewed by Rob Jenkins 
summed up the Rajasthan BJP message thus: “It is to spread the idea 
of equality to the rest of India that they must vote BJP, we tell them”. 
(Jenkins 1998: 112)
It is difficult to know the extent to which the message of Rajput 
Hindutva caught on. Certainly Rajasthanis have become stalwart BJP 
voters; when four BJP state governments were dismissed at the end of 
1992, only Rajasthan’s  retained power.  Another feature of  Rajasthan 
politics is important here,  however:  the growing influence of  the Jat 
middle caste. The Jats had become increasingly powerful in Rajasthan 
since  the  mid-1960s,  having  benefitted  from  a  canal  project  that 
irritated large tracts of the state’s northern and western deserts. But 
they  had  not  formed  alliances  with  other  middle  jatis,  who  grew 
suspicious of them. Congress leaders did little  to allay such fears in 
1993, by emphasizing that if the Congress came to power a Jat would 
become the state’s Chief Minister for the first time. (Jenkins 1998: 112-
14) So the BJP’s triumphs in Rajasthan may have had less to do with 
Hindutva and more with rivalries among middle castes.
Likewise, the Kurmis and Lodhs of Uttar Pradesh resented the 
influence of  the Yadavs, the largest middle caste in the state, whose 
members were active and influential in the Janata Dal (while the upper 
castes  were most  influential  in  the  Congress).  The BJP provided an 
alternative. (Brass 1993: 267-8) It is sometimes suggested that these 
castes even feel “terrorized” by the Yadavs, and as a result deliberately 
vote differently from the Yadavs, for whichever party is most likely to 
defeat the Yadav party. (Brass 1997: 2416)
However, these examples of horizontal inter-caste rivalry, while 
they help explain support for the BJP, do not explain political Hindutva, 
which  is  my  topic.  Hindutva,  I  argue,  is  best  understood  as  a 
legitimation strategy of the northern dominant upper castes.
Let  me  be  clear:  I  am not  claiming  that  Hindutva  derives  its 
relevance by reasserting the traditional caste hierarchy. To be sure, the 
caste  system  has  always  been  intimately  associated  with  the  term 
“Hinduism”;  of  those  scholars  who  think that  Hinduism exists  as  a 
single phenomenon with an essential core, many identify that core as 
the caste system and its ideology (Jaiswal 1998, for example). And most 
BJP leaders observe rituals in which brahminical practices and notions 
of  purity  and  pollution  are  strictly  maintained  (Shah 1998:  256),  a 
feature  which  I  think  makes  the  southern  Shudra  dominant  caste 
leaders  uncomfortable  with  the  party.  But  in  spite  of  these  caste 
features  of  the  movement,  most  Hindutva  writing  denounces 
untouchability and the hereditary basis of caste divisions. 
Hindutva  is  more  subtle  than  directly  preaching  a  renewal  of 
caste  hierarchy.  The  upper  castes  know  they  could  never  win  that 
battle. Privately, some Hindutva advocates may make statements like 
this: “After all, there is something like blood and sanskar, i.e. cultural 
heritage and we have to have marriage relationship [sic] within castes. 
Norms of caste have to be respected.” (quoted in Shah 1998: 256) But 
publicly, it is rare to find BJP leaders, especially in the upper ranks of 
the party, defending caste differentiation; and they will even proclaim 
support for measures against caste differentiation like Mandal (see next 
chapter).  Instead,  like  Singapore  Confucianism,  Hindutva  preaches 
what one of its leading thinkers (Upadhyaya 1979) calls an “integral” 
approach,  stressing  the  unity  of  a  community  against  outsiders.  By 
promoting cultural symbols as common to a community, it attempts to 
prevent  the  majority  of  that  community  from rising  up  against  the 
community’s dominant groups, partially by attempting to redirect their 
hostility to threats outside the community.
In this respect, it is instructive to consider that although the Jan 
Sangh attempted  to  broaden  its  appeal  to  the  working  classes,  “the 
party kept faith with its clientèle in small business by refusing to use 
the rhetoric of class conflict in its appeals to employees.  It began as 
and remained a party of class conciliation and co-operation.” (Graham 
1990: 170) It seems to me that the BJP is following exactly the same 
approach — but the changed social relations of the past twenty years 
have given this approach a much greater appeal. The Jan Sangh was a 
party  composed  of  upper-caste  city  dwellers  who  had  lost   their 
traditional legitimacy. This group has vastly increased in size, and it 
has therefore pushed Hindutva to the forefront of Indian society.
I submit that the decline of dominant-caste legitimacy — which, 
in the major BJP states, primarily means upper-caste legitimacy — is 
the key reason why hostility to Muslims has become a major feature of 
Indian  politics  so  recently.  Although  riots  between  Muslims  and 
“Hindus”  have  been  present  at  other  points  in  India’s  history  (the 
bloodshed of Partition in 1947 being the most famous, widespread and 
terrible),  they  had  been  far  less  frequent  until  the  Babri  Masjid 
confrontation.  Riots claimed over 500 lives in 1989 alone, almost twice 
as many as the previous year (Gupta 1990: 27). The Babri Masjid itself 
was  barely  discussed  as  an  issue  until  the  VHP  raised  it  in  1985 
(Raychaudhuri 1995: 143).
I think this stirring of communal conflict is rooted in a desire to 
ensure that the lower castes see their interests as lying with the upper 
castes rather than with Muslims. The Dalit leader Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
put it well: “a caste has no feeling that it is affiliated to other castes 
except  when there  is  a  Hindu-Muslim riot”  (quoted  in  Sarkar  1996: 
291). Politically, Amrita Basu (1996: 74) argues that the BJP’s decision 
to throw its support behind the Babri Masjid agitation and organize the 
Ayodhya  procession  came  as  an  aftereffect  of  the  Janata  Dal’s 
implementation  of  Mandal.  That  Janata  Dal  policy  ensured  OBC 
(especially Yadav) support for the Janata Dal in Uttar Pradesh, which 
led the BJP to look instead to Dalits to broaden its electoral base — and 
the riots which followed in the wake of the agitation helped accomplish 
this.  Consider, for example, the words of one informant interviewed by 
Zoya Hasan in Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh, after the 1990 riots: “In the 
1989 elections we would not have even dreamt of voting for a candidate 
just because he was a Hindu.  We had all voted for the Janata Dal’s 
Rasheed Masood.  But today, no.  We’ll  vote for a Hindu candidate.” 
(Hasan 1998: 213)
Consider further the state of Gujarat, where the BJP’s rise was 
meteoric (table 1, page ). In 1981 and 1984, agitations over reservations 
“often  turned  into  Hindu-Muslim  riots  in  which  intra-party  faction 
fights  of  the  Congress  and  the  BJP’s  call  for  Hindu  unity  played 
significant roles.” (Shah 1991: 2923) Hindu-Muslim riots, confined to 
cities in previous decades, spread to the countryside in the 1980s. The 
rath yatra procession to “liberate” the Ayodhya mosque, which resulted 
in riots  in many of  the places it  passed through,  began in Gujarat. 
(Shah 1991: 2923-4)
Most recently, the hostility of the Hindutva movement has been 
directed more against Christians than Muslims. And I think its anti-
Christian rhetoric and action may demonstrate even more clearly the 
connection  between  Hindutva  and  the  preservation  of  upper-caste 
legitimacy. Violent attacks on Christian institutions in India were rare 
until  1998,  but  108  such  attacks  occurred  in  that  year  alone 
(Fernandes 1999: 83).  These attacks followed an increasing volume of 
angry  rhetoric  by  the  mainstream  Hindutva  movement  against 
conversions  to  Christianity  (Chari  1996  contains  several  typical 
examples),  attempting  to  arouse  fear  of  a  decline  in  the  Hindu 
population of  the  country  –  a curious fear  when one considers  that 
between 1981 and 1991 the census registered an actual decline in the 
proportion  of  Indians  who  professed  Christianity  as  their  religion 
(Fernandes 1999: 81). 
The Hindutva movement kept up its anti-conversion rhetoric as 
the violence proceeded. B.L. Sharma, a former BJP MP, proclaimed that 
the gang rape of  four  nuns in  Madhya Pradesh was a  result  of  the 
